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NEW TECHNOLOGY, THE DEATH OF THE BIGLAW MONOPOLY 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER PROFESSIONAL 
Dr. Michael Guihot* 
Much has been written recently about new technology 
disrupting1 the traditional law firm model of providing legal 
services.2 Susskind and Susskind predicted the failure of professions, 
including the legal profession, due in large part to the external 
pressure of disruptive technology.3 However, concentrating blame 
on the technology is misguided; it blames the tool used to disrupt 
rather than the root causes of the disruption. In short, computers do 
not kill lawyers. Neither is the disruption aimed at the profession as 
such, but rather at the business models of modern day legal 
practices that have developed under the auspices of the profession. 
Under the guise of a profession, the legal profession has established 
the barriers to entry that have allowed lawyers to hold a monopoly 
on providing legal services. The monopoly has allowed law firms to 
develop business models through which they have been able to 
                                                 
 *  Senior Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology. Before entering 
academia, the author spent 10 years in legal practice, including as in-house 
counsel and as a partner in a law firm. Thank you to my colleagues Kylie 
Pappalardo, Leon Wolff and Judith McNamara for reviewing early drafts of this 
paper and providing helpful comments. 
 1 “‘Disruption’ describes a process whereby a smaller company with fewer 
resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent businesses.”  
Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, What is 
Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, at 46. 
 2 See, e.g., Jason Koebler, Is Artificial Intelligence Making Lawyers a 
Disappearing Profession?, FIN. REV. (Apr. 25, 2017, 12:38 AM), 
http://www.afr.com/business/legal/is-artificial-intelligence-making-lawyers-a-
disappearing-profession-20170418-gvmzbs; Dan Mangan, Lawyers Could Be the 
Next Profession to Be Replaced by Computers, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:33 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/17/lawyers-could-be-replaced-by-
artificial-intelligence.html. 
 3 RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: 
HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS 154–55 
(2015). 
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charge high, sometimes extravagant, prices for their services. It has 
also produced barriers to innovation. Clients have begun to react to 
perceived consistent overcharging and inefficient services of the 
BigLaw firms that benefit from the monopoly at the same time that 
technologies are becoming more powerful and effective. Meanwhile, 
new and hungry legal service providers who provide alternative 
business models to law firms are also using new technologies to 
open access to law and erode the monopoly. Lawyers are facing 
increasing competition that is set to destroy the BigLaw firm model. 
The disruption, though, will not be limited to BigLaw, and will also 
impact smaller law firms and sole practitioners.  
As the dynamic between clients and lawyers changes, the next 
generation of lawyers will be required to perform a vast number of 
roles to satisfy client demands while all the while being asked to 
maintain their professional responsibilities. Lawyers, as humans, 
will be incapable of, or disinterested in, managing the demands of 
this multi-faceted role, and the professional aspect of the role will 
further recede. However, computers have vast technical knowledge, 
they do not seek financial reward, and they can be programmed to 
work ceaselessly and to put the client’s interests ahead of their own. 
It is computers, therefore, that will be in a much better position to 
display “professional” characteristics than humans in the future. If 
it is desirable to have a legal profession, then it is in the interests of 
our society to allow computers to take the role of legal services 
providers. It will be necessary to take the profession out of the hands 
of self-interested humans and to develop a technological profession 
that would provide legal services, initially with the assistance of 
lawyers, but then, as with the introduction of autonomous vehicles, 
in a five-staged deployment, develop a fully autonomous legal 
profession. This new technological profession would also 
subordinate “personal aims and ambitions to the service of . . . [the 
law] discipline and the promotion of its function in the community”4 
and begin to regain the trust so lacking in the legal profession today. 
 
 
                                                 
 4 Daryl Dawson, The Legal Services Market, 5 J. JUD. ADM. 147, 148 (1996). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Law is a profession.5 It evolved from around the twelfth century 
as individuals within the church developed expertise in canon law6 
and, over time, developed the characteristics that many now use to 
distinguish a profession: “special skill and learning; public service 
as the principal goal; and autonomy or self-regulation.”7 However, 
the legal profession, as dominated by large law firms, has more 
recently drifted from its professional moorings and, in doing so, has 
opened itself up for disruption.8 Some commentators have argued 
that the disruption of the legal services industry could spell the death 
of the profession.9 Susskind surmised that new technologies may 
result in the end of lawyers.10 He posited that commoditization of 
legal work and new technologies would combine to make the 
traditional work of the lawyer redundant.11 This analysis over-
simplifies Susskind’s prodigious output on the subject, but I agree 
with his ultimate conclusion that technology will have a disruptive 
effect on the legal services market. However, Susskind elides the 
                                                 
 5 YSAIAH ROSS, ETHICS IN LAW: LAWYERS’ RESPONSIBILITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AUSTRALIA 57 (5th ed. 2010). 
 6 James A. Brundage, The Rise of the Professional Jurist in the Thirteenth 
Century, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 185, 186 (1994). 
 7 G. E. DAL PONT, LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5 (4th ed. 2010); 
see ROSS, supra note 5, at 58–59. 
 8 Christensen, Raynor & McDonald, supra note 1, at 44. Christensen, et al. 
define disruption as a process in which smaller, less-well-resourced companies 
provide products and services that challenge larger incumbent companies. Id. The 
smaller companies take advantage of the tendency of the larger incumbents to 
concentrate resources on their most profitable clients. Id. This leaves the 
disrupting companies free to provide the overlooked clients with “more-suitable 
functionality—frequently at a lower price.” Id. Disruption is complete when the 
smaller disruptive companies develop their products and services to a point where 
mainstream customers adopt them in volume. Id. 
 9 See Robert F. Cochran Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, 
Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305, 308–11 (2000); Bob Murray, Will Law Firms Be 
Digitised to Death?, LAW. WKLY. (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/opinion/19702-will-law-firms-be-digitized-
to-death. 
 10 See generally RICHARD E. SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING 
THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 
 11 Id. at 27. 
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root cause of the disruption. I argue that there is a malignancy that 
has metastasized in two of the ideals that define a profession (that 
is, the requirements for special skill and learning, and self-regulation 
and autonomy) that has led to the legal profession holding a 
monopoly on providing legal services. This monopoly has led to big 
law firms becoming businesses in pursuit of profits, rather than true 
members of a profession. It is this business-oriented pursuit of 
monopoly profits that has developed in place of a more professional 
(in the traditional sense) approach to client service that has opened 
the legal services market up to disruption. 
Part II of this paper teases out the tenets of a profession and 
emphasizes the professional ethics of service to society as a defining 
characteristic. A profession sets the level of education required, and 
the credentials that individuals must attain, to enter it.12 A profession 
is typically also responsible for constantly testing the capabilities of 
its members and for expelling those who fail to maintain the required 
levels of competence and “character.”13 The legal profession 
upholds these entry requirements with vigor. Ironically, though, by 
enshrining these defining characteristics of professions the legal 
profession has excluded others from performing “legal work” and 
has thus created a monopoly on providing legal services.14 
                                                 
 12 See, for example, regulation five of the Legal Profession Uniform Admission 
Rules of New South Wales, which sets out the prerequisite academic 
qualifications as: 
successfully completing a tertiary academic course in Australia, whether 
or not leading to a degree in law, which: 
(a)  includes the equivalent of at least 3 years’ full-time study of law, 
(b) is accredited by the Board, and 
(c)  the Board determines will provide for a student to acquire and 
demonstrate appropriate understanding and competence in each element 
of the academic areas of knowledge set out in Schedule 1, or otherwise 
determined by the Admissions Committee after consulting each of the 
Boards. 
Legal Profession Uniform Law 2015 (NSW) reg 5 (Austl.). 
 13 Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 543, 548–49 (2004). 
 14 See JOSEPH W BARTLETT, THE LAW BUSINESS: A TIRED MONOPOLY 7–19 
(1982); TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, 
AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 16–23 (1987); Bridgette Dunlap, Anyone 
Can "Think Like a Lawyer": How the Lawyers’ Monopoly on Legal 
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Part III examines the monopoly that lawyers hold over the 
provision of legal services. It also addresses the damaging impact 
that monopolies, in any industry, pose to prices and innovation. The 
literature on monopolies, in general, is not kind;15 there are a number 
of social and economic costs associated with them including that 
monopolists charge higher prices and fail to innovate.16 Monopolies 
also lead to a deadweight loss to society, which, in the case of the 
lawyer monopoly, has led to problems with the majority of society 
being able to access justice. The social and economic costs of 
monopolies have been evident in the legal profession, mostly in big 
law firms, for many years and have eroded the tenets that make law 
a profession in the first place. In doing so, they have created fertile 
ground for disruption.17 Susskind and Susskind acknowledged the 
monopoly held by professions, including the legal profession, and 
that the cost of legal services was a key driver in a technological 
response to the monopoly.18 They argued that the commoditization 
of legal work and technological innovation would erode the 
monopoly and lead to the end of the profession.19 They reported the 
monopoly merely as a fact of the modern legal profession. I argue 
that it is the monopoly itself that has brought the legal profession to 
the point at which it is now ripe for disruption. It is the monopoly, 
                                                 
Understanding Undermines Democracy and the Rule of Law in the United States, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2817, 2821–23 (2014); Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth 
and Other Tales about the Superiority of Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 
2611 (2013). 
 15 See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
43–57 (2004). 
 16 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. 
POL. ECON. 807, 807–27 (1975); MOTTA, supra note 15. 
 17 Here, I must distinguish between the big law firms that act as businesses from 
the large number of hard-working lawyers, such as dedicated local sole 
practitioners, or those in community legal centers or indigenous legal services, or 
even hardworking, honest lawyers within the large law firms whose work does 
contribute to the greater good of society. In Part IV, I make the argument that for 
these large law firms, law has become a business rather than a profession. 
However, in my experience, I know of several lawyers within large law firms that 
maintain high ideals and professionalism despite the corrosive effect of the 
business imperatives of Big Law. 
 18 SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 27, 67–68. 
 19 Id. at 67–68. 
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and all that comes with it that has caused the underlying 
environment that feeds the disruption. Concentrating blame on the 
technology misses the point; it blames the tool used to disrupt rather 
than its root cause. New technology alone does not disrupt an 
industry. Disruption is a reaction to, for example, client 
dissatisfaction. That dissatisfaction stems in large part from 
overpricing, failures to innovate and the deadweight loss to 
society—natural outcomes of monopolies. NewLaw,20 using new 
technologies, is disrupting traditional models of providing legal 
services. However, the new technology is merely the tool that is 
enabling new solutions. It is the means by which the disruptive 
forces can have their way. 
In Part IV, I argue that, because the legal profession has been 
able to maintain a monopoly on providing legal services, law has 
become a business that has drifted from its professional moorings. I 
discuss how BigLaw21 has for many years maintained its business 
model which relies on leveraging large numbers of junior lawyers 
                                                 
 20 Eric Chin, 2018: The Year Axiom Becomes the World’s Largest Legal 
Services Firm, BEATON CAP. (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://www.beatoncapital.com/2013/09/2018-year-axiom-becomes-worlds-
largest-legal-services-firm/ (defining the term “NewLaw”). For a definition of 
“NewLaw,” see infra Part V.C.1  
 21 The traits of BigLaw are (or have been described as): 
• Attraction and training of top legal talent, 
• ‘Leveraging’ of these full-time lawyers to do the bulk of the work 
serving clients, 
• Creation of a tournament to motivate the lawyers to strive to 
become equity partners (the idea of a tournament is akin to Roman 
gladiator contests and the subject of a seminal book), 
• Tight restriction on the number of equity owners, 
• Structuring as a partnership, and 
• Charging high hourly rates (which is or at least until very recently 
has been possible because of the mystique associated with legal 
advice). 
George Beaton, Last Days of the BigLaw Business Model?, BEATON CAP. (Sept. 
6, 2013),  http://www.beatoncapital.com/2013/09/last-days-biglaw-business-
model/. Perhaps one day soon we will witness the Amazon of law—a single law 
firm that will provide advice to all of the world’s largest companies. Conflicts of 
interest may prevent one single large law firm of this nature, but if there are only 
two or three such firms remaining, then all of the world’s corporate work can be 
divided among these firms. 
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working long hours to push profits up to the partner level. 
Technology threatens to make much of that level of lawyers 
redundant. Law firms, whose profit model depends on leveraging, 
will seek to resist the disruption but its impact is insistent, and the 
barriers that define the lawyers’ monopoly are falling. The pressures 
I outline in Part V of this paper are leading to some interesting 
outcomes. BigLaw is reacting to these pressures and is trying to 
stave off its demise by adopting new technologies. This creates a 
feedback loop in which the BigLaw firms adopt and beta test new 
technology which leads to better, faster, and more intrusive 
technology being able to do more of the work currently performed 
by lawyers. Ironically, it is only the BigLaw firms that have the 
scale, large data sets, and financial strength to be able to test some 
of these new technologies and allow them to “learn” and improve 
their capabilities. By buying into this process, so they can be seen 
adopting new technology, the large law firms may be hastening their 
own disruption.22 Unfortunately for the rest of the legal profession, 
once the beta testing is completed and prices for new technologies 
reduce because of economies of scale built over time, new 
technologies will eventually drop onto the rest of the legal service 
industry with catastrophic effect. 
Despite the emphasis in the literature on technology being the 
disrupting force, there are other forces that have allowed technology 
to become a disruptive tool in the first place. In Part V, I argue that 
there are five distinct forces creating pressure on law firms—the 
                                                 
 22 For example, The Law Society of New South Wales noted that: 
Large law firms accustomed to operating in traditional ways are hedging 
their bets by forging alliances with start-ups. Last year, the Australian 
office of Norton Rose Fulbright increased its financial stake in 
Australia’s LawPath, a company that supplies low-cost documents 
online and connects clients to lawyers for fixed-price work. Also in 
2016, Gilbert + Tobin increased its stake in Australian technology-
enabled legal practice LegalVision by close to 20 per cent, from 
$600,000. Allens has developed its own suite of fully downloadable, free 
documents for the start-up market and has reported 3,000 unique 
downloads as of July 2016. 
THE L. SOC’Y OF NSW, THE FUTURE OF LAW AND INNOVATION IN THE 
PROFESSION 31 (Gary Ulman et al. eds., 2017). 
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archetypal model for providing legal services23—that are creating 
fertile ground for disruptive innovation in the legal services market. 
The first pressure is created because legal services have been 
overpriced for a long time. The predominant structure of the modern 
legal practice—the partnership within a monopoly—has allowed 
lawyers to charge clients by the hour in increments of six minutes, 
which has, over time, driven up prices for fundamentally inefficient 
practices.24 I argue that this overcharging by law firms is the biggest 
determinant of disruption to the profession. Overcharging, and a 
lack of innovative service, another outcome of monopolies, seems 
to have reached its apogee sometime in the last ten to twenty years 
and clients have begun to push back. Clients are now pressuring law 
firms to reduce fees and to use fee models other than the billable 
hour.25 Before the interruption of new technologies, law firms have 
been able to resist these client demands. Now, other pressures are 
combining with client pressure to lessen that resistance. 
The second pressure on the traditional or incumbent legal 
service providers is that, for a number of years, there has been a 
consistent oversupply of lawyers into the market.26 This has led to 
two outcomes: firstly, those law graduates who left legal practice or 
                                                 
 23 The structure of the legal services market with law firms as the dominant 
force is outlined infra Part IV. 
 24 See Tim Williams, Busy Fools vs. Eureka Moments, IGNITION CONSULTING 
GROUP (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.ignitiongroup.com/propulsion-blog/paying-
for-busy-fools-or-eureka-moments. 
 25 David Ruiz, Microsoft Rethinks Law Firm Relationships as 13 Join 
Alternative Billing and Diversity Initiative, LEGAL WK. (Aug. 8, 2017), 
http://www.legalweek.com/sites/legalweek/2017/08/08/microsoft-rethinks-law-
firm-relationships-as-13-firms-join-alternative-billing-and-diversity-push/. 
 26 Christine Parker, An Oversupply of Law Graduates? Putting the Statistics in 
Context, 4 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 255, 255 (1993). Parker refuted the claims of 
oversupply in this 1993 article. See generally id. However, since 1993, the number 
of law schools in Australia has doubled and, as a result, the number of law 
graduates has concomitantly increased. See Peter Woelert & Gwilym Croucher, 
The Multiple Dynamics of Isomorphic Change: Australian Law Schools 1987–
1996, 56 MINERVA 479, 491–92 (2018); see also David Weisbrot, What Lawyers 
Need to Know What Lawyers Need to Be Able to Do: An Australian Experience, 
1 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 21, 29 (2002) (“[L]awyer numbers have 
continued to grow, leading to greater intra-professional competition.”). 
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chose in the first place not to become practicing lawyers27 have 
added to a society that is better educated in the law and legal 
matters,28 and this more educated population has continued to 
demystify the law and dilute the monopoly in legal knowledge 
traditionally held by law firms.  
Secondly, and relatedly, this oversupply of lawyers that are 
leaving law firms creates a third pressure on the big law firm service 
model. The diaspora of lawyers has created an explosion of legal 
service providers able to offer easier access to law at a much lower 
cost than the traditional law firm partnership and has spawned a new 
term: “NewLaw.”29 These NewLaw providers create alternative 
models of providing legal services to the longstanding structure of 
the law firm partnership. They are also able to compete with law 
firms by harnessing the recent exponential increase in the power, 
availability, and utility of new technology, including technology that 
is specifically designed to do the work of lawyers.30 In effect, they 
have been given a loaded gun. These new entrants to the market (the 
disruptors) are finding ways to provide innovative and cost effective 
legal services outside the traditional law firm partnership model.31 
Consequently, the traditional clients of law firms, such as in-house 
                                                 
 27 Nicola Berkovic, Fewer Law Graduates Are Choosing Practice as a Career, 
AUSTRALIAN (July 1, 2011), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-
affairs/fewer-law-graduates-are-choosing-practice-as-a-career/news-
story/03552d1a9a5f1c85dd15f1145e2e208d?sv=95a9d2c40ca3d9327d8681cb14
fbaade (noting that “the proportion of law graduates taking jobs in industry or 
commerce jumped from 13.5 per cent to 20.1 per cent” between 2005 and 2010). 
 28 These are what Furlong refers to as “self-navigators.” See Jordan Furlong, 
The Pivot Generation: How Tomorrow’s Lawyers Will Help Build a New and 
Better Legal Market, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 428 (2017). 
 29 See Chin, supra note 20 (coining the term “NewLaw”). 
 30 For example, see Ailira, which is marketed as: 
an artificial intelligence that uses natural language processing to provide 
free legal information on a broad range of legal issues, including 
Business Structuring, Wills and Estate Planning and much more coming 
soon! In addition, you can use Ailira to instantly generate Australian 
legal documents for your business and personal use, much cheaper and 
faster than a visit to a lawyer would take. 
AILIRA, https://www.ailira.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
 31 See, e.g., NEXUS LAW GROUP, https://www.nexuslawyers.com.au/ (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
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legal counsel, who are subject to their own cost pressures, are now 
more willing to acquire their legal services from this greater range 
of providers.32 
The fourth force pressuring traditional models of providing legal 
services (although in combination with the other three) is the new 
technology itself. Over the last 30 years, there have been exponential 
advances in computer technology, including in the sub-categories of 
artificial intelligence: machine learning, natural language 
processing, and computer vision.33 Savvy legal entrepreneurs are 
able to use these new technologies to help clients unlock access to 
law that has been for so long under the control of lawyers and law 
firms. Some of the first applications of new technologies in law 
include expertise automation systems designed specifically to 
systematize routine tasks, such as common advices, previously 
performed by lawyers.34 Other applications target document review, 
legal research, and case prediction. 
Further, because of improvements in technology, the primary 
sources of the law are much more freely available on the internet 
and are constantly updated.35 This development, related and 
dependent on improvements in technology, is the fifth element that 
is pressuring the business model of BigLaw. It is democratizing 
legal knowledge that for so long has been in the sole keep of 
lawyers. The combination of powerful computer technology and 
free access to law is allowing not only law firms but also NewLaw 
entrepreneurs to provide legal services quicker and cheaper than 
ever before.36 Free access to law also allows sophisticated business 
                                                 
 32 See MAHLAB, MAHLAB REPORT 2016: CORPORATE 4 (2016) 
https://docplayer.net/40663725-Mahlab-report-2016-corporate-corporate-
lawyers-company-secretaries.html. 
 33 This exponential trajectory seems to have flattened in the last few years. See 
The End of Moore’s Law, RODNEY BROOKS (Feb. 4, 2017), 
https://rodneybrooks.com/the-end-of-moores-law/. However, this has not slowed 
the onslaught of new technology from NewLaw providers and developers of new 
technology aimed squarely at the law firm monopoly. 
 34 See, e.g., NEOTA LOGIC, https://www.neotalogic.com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 
2019) (advertising drag and drop software products). 
 35 See infra Part V.E (referencing the Austlii effect). 
 36 Governments have seen the need to legislate to combat overcharging and 
inefficiency. For example, the overriding purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 
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people to access and understand their legal rights without having to 
refer to law firms. 
The disruption of the BigLaw services model will have an 
impact on the way that legal services are provided in the future, but 
it is difficult to predict what that market will look like in, say, twenty 
years’ time.37 Part VI discusses some of the impacts of these changes 
on the legal profession already and provides some predictions about 
what changes need to be made to prepare new lawyers for a 
profession in flux. It is the nature of disruption that change happens 
quickly. One thing is certain—the way that legal services are 
delivered in the near future will be a far cry from the rigid way that 
the profession has carried on business over the last 200 or so years. 
Despite this, these changes in the profession do not have to be a bad 
thing. In many ways, by facilitating greater service and freer access 
to law at a lower cost, new technology could pre-empt a new 
profession. In the new profession, lawyers will be required to 
embrace new technologies or perish. Disruption has a tendency to 
subvert the status quo, no matter the intentions of the incumbent. 
Furlong predicted some radical changes in the work that lawyers 
will be required to perform in the future, all the while displaying the 
characteristics of a professional. I argue that computers are much 
more suited to this new environment and could potentially provide 
a much more professional service than humans. The goals of 
providing a public service is an important defining characteristic of 
                                                 
(NSW) and the rules of the court stated in section 56 to be the “just, quick and 
cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings” as opposed to a drawn out 
and expensive resolution. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56 (Austl.). 
 37 See, e.g., Furlong, supra note 28, at 416 (“The legal market is transforming, 
and it is not at all clear what the result of that transformation will be.”);  My Dated 
Predictions, RODNEY BROOKS (Jan. 1, 2018), https://rodneybrooks.com/my-
dated-predictions/ (providing predictions on the probability of certain events 
occurring within the next thirty-two years); see also PETER STONE ET AL., 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030 (2016), 
https://ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report (exposing the practical limitations on 
seeking to predict impacts of developing AI in the next 15 years in eight key 
domains: transportation, healthcare, education, public safety and security, 
employment, workforce, and entertainment). 
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a profession38 that sets it apart from a trade or an occupation. The 
legal profession, as dominated by large law firms, has strayed from 
this ideal; but, with the intervention of new technology, it might be 
able to regain some of its fundamental character. 
Part VII concludes with a note of optimism for the rebirth of law 
as a profession—only with computers at the helm. After all, as with 
taxi drivers and truck drivers, themselves subject to disruption 
through technology, not many in society will mourn the loss of the 
lawyer. I argue that, far from being the death of the profession, 
technology should allow more people to gain greater access to the 
law at a lower cost. Surely, this is laudable as an aim of society; that 
its citizens should have free, or at least affordable, access to the laws 
that govern them and not be beholden to those members of a 
monopoly privileged enough to define and control that access. There 
will still be a need for lawyers with their expertise in the law to guide 
development of new laws and to lead members of society through 
the intricacies of interpreting and applying the law. Therefore, the 
advent of new technologies that can perform many tasks currently 
performed by lawyers may bring, not the decline of a profession, but 
its rebirth and the opportunity for lawyers to become true 
professionals again. 
II.  LAW AS A PROFESSION 
Examining the tenets of a profession highlights firstly how far 
the legal profession, as epitomized by BigLaw firms, has strayed 
from the core tenets of professionalism and, secondly, to light a clear 
path back. In Parts III and IV, I demonstrate how far from the path 
of professionalism the legal services industry has strayed. In the 
latter half of the paper, I highlight the positives that might be taken 
from the current disruption of the industry that might signal the 
rebirth of the profession—albeit a technologically enhanced version. 
Firstly, though, I attempt to clarify what a profession, and in 
particular, what the legal profession is (or could be). 
                                                 
 38 Although it is difficult to use a set of traits to define professionalism, this 
characteristic is predominant in many descriptions of professions and is discussed 
more fully in Part II of the paper. 
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There is no settled definition of a profession, but there are a 
number of attributes or traits that have been used to mark out a 
profession. These include: 
• skill based on theoretical knowledge; 
• the provision of training and education; 
• testing the competence of members; 
• an ethical code of conduct; and 
• altruistic service.39 
But these traits now describe a number of occupations other than 
the traditional professions such as medicine, law, and the clergy and 
as such, their use in distinguishing professions from other 
occupations has lessened.40 Rizzardi, former attorney for the 
Department of Justice and member of the Florida Bar’s ethics and 
professionalism committees, analogized Supreme Court Justice 
Potter Stewart’s reference to classifying pornography, “I know it 
when I see it,”41 to help define professionalism. The obverse might 
also be true: we know it when we do not see it; that is, when so-
called professionals or professions no longer seem to act 
professionally.42 
There is a considerable body of literature that espouses the 
altruistic ideals of the legal profession. Lawyer professionalism has 
been described as “high competency in the knowledge and skills 
necessary for professional work, respect for the justice system and 
its participants, and ‘civic trusteeship’ or an attitude of ‘public 
altruism’ by every lawyer toward the justice system.”43 In 1953, 
Roscoe Pound, former Dean of Harvard Law School, defined a 
profession as: 
a group . . . pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of 
public service - no less a public service because it may incidentally be a 
                                                 
 39 See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 5, at 58–59. 
 40 Id. at 59. 
 41 Keith W. Rizzardi, Defining Professionalism: I Know It When I See It?, FLA. 
B.J., July–Aug. 2005, at 38. 
 42 SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 33–37. 
 43 John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into 
Legal Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 323, 331 (2008). 
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means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public 
service is the primary purpose.44 
Chief Judge Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals, in 1974, 
differentiated the legal profession from a business and emphasized 
a professional’s “duty to subordinate financial reward to social 
responsibility, and, notably, an obligation on its members, even in 
nonprofessional matters, to conduct themselves as members of a 
learned, disciplined, and honorable occupation.”45 
In 1986, the Stanley Report, reporting on falling levels of legal 
professionalism (or rather, the lack of it demonstrated in the legal 
profession at that time) settled on the following, more prosaic and 
aspirational definition of the legal profession: 
An occupation whose members have special privileges, such as 
exclusive licensing, that are justified by the following assumptions: 
1. That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and the use 
of complex judgments; 
2. That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the 
service, they must trust those they consult; 
3. That the client’s trust presupposes that the practitioner’s self-interest 
is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client’s interest and the 
public good; and 
4. That the occupation is self-regulating—that is, organized in such a 
way as to assure the public and the courts that its members are competent, 
do not violate their client’s trust, and transcend their own self-interest.46 
By the late 1980s then, descriptions of the legal profession that 
included notions of altruism and a common calling to pursue a 
learned art, tended to do so longingly, more in hope, than as a 
description of the profession as it had become. In 1992, Terrell and 
Wildman opined that the legal profession had an obligation to “help 
the legal system remain the centerpiece of our fragile sense of 
community, [and] help it continue to function within our culture as 
                                                 
 44 JUSTIN A. STANLEY, ET AL., COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, A.B.A., “. . . .  IN 
THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER 
PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/mi
grated/2011_build/professional_responsibility/stanley_commission_report.pdf 
[hereinafter Stanley Report] (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM 
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)). 
 45 In the Matter of Freeman, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1974). 
 46 STANLEY, ET AL., BLUEPRINT, supra note 44, at 10. 
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the crucial mechanism for social cohesion and stability;”47 the 
implication being that social cohesion and a sense of community 
was, indeed, fragile and soon to be lost. However, as I discuss in 
Part VI, this is the very role that computers can fill as they develop. 
By 1996, there was a marked shift in the directness of remarks 
by the judiciary about the lack of these characteristics in the 
professionalism of the legal community. In that year, Justice 
Michael Kirby, then of the High Court of Australia, challenged the 
legal profession to “re-evaluate its conduct with a view to enhancing 
the level of service provided to a community which has ever-
increasing expectations of the profession but a diminishing 
estimation of the likelihood that such expectations will be 
fulfilled.”48 
The idea that legal professionals would “subordinate financial 
reward” to the greater good of society were completely missing from 
these later descriptions of lawyer professionalism and seem to have 
been abandoned sometime after the 1970s. Computers do not need 
or pursue financial reward. So, while this characteristic of 
professionalism may have fallen off the list for human lawyers, it is 
still attainable by computers. 
In 1996, former Justice of the High Court of Australia, Sir Daryl 
Dawson, described this loss by comparing the traditional notion of 
a professional to the modern day exemplar: 
Traditionally the aim of a profession was to promote the purpose for 
which it existed. The primary aim of a professional man or woman was 
not to make money but to provide, for example, good health care or good 
legal services. To be sure, the professional practitioner generally made a 
good living . . . . But it was the subordination of personal aims and 
ambitions to the service of a particular discipline and the promotion of 
its function in the community which marked out a profession. A member 
                                                 
 47 Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism," 41 
EMORY L.J. 403, 423 (1992). This approach to lawyer professionalism that 
emphasizes a greater duty to society as a primary trait is not without its detractors. 
See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism 
Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 317–21 (1995) (discussing a range of lawyer types 
that challenge the one true professional lawyer stereotype proposed by the 
“professionalism crusade”). 
 48 Michael Kirby, Billable Hours in a Noble Calling?, 21 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 
257, 257 (1996). 
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of a profession was an educated person whose knowledge was acquired, 
not for the purpose of sale, but on trust for the benefit of the profession 
itself and the community which it serves. That is to say, professional 
practice involved the use by practitioners of the knowledge which they 
acquired through their education, not in the conduct of an enterprise 
intent on acquiring the largest market share and making the most profits, 
but as individuals serving their clients and, through them, the 
community.49 
Sir Daryl then differentiated what he referred to as “social 
trustee professionalism” and “expert professionalism;” the former 
exhibiting the service aspects outlined in the quote above while the 
latter was “concerned with the marketing of expertise rather than 
with the use of knowledge in the service of the client or the 
community.”50 Expert professionalism—that is, monetizing legal 
knowledge—Sir Daryl said, more closely described the modern day 
legal profession. Similarly, Halliday argued that there is a spectrum 
of behaviors that fit within the definition of professional: one set of 
behaviors that is “monopolistic, even narcissistic, and the other 
benign, even altruistic.”51 Both commentators seem to reluctantly 
accept the bad behavior (either economic or narcissistic) as now 
being a characteristic of a profession. There seems to be some 
acceptance that these aberrant behaviors now fit within a definition 
of a modern legal profession. 
It is unclear whether this seeming acceptance by Dawson and 
Halliday of a more economic or narcissistic bent in legal 
professionals reflected a shift in the societal attitudes towards the 
norms that underpinned the legal profession. Whatever level of 
acceptance there was, or has been in the last twenty years, it is 
apparent that from around the mid-1990s, the notions of lawyer 
professionalism were changing to reflect more mercenary-like 
characteristics.52 The modern practice of law, especially under the 
auspices of BigLaw firms, has strayed from its professional roots. 
Susskind and Susskind noted that this behavior is similar across all 
                                                 
 49 Dawson, supra note 4, at 148. 
 50 Id. 
 51 HALLIDAY, supra note 14, at 3. 
 52 Modern day references to sports people (e.g., professional footballers) also 
may tend to conflate the notions of a true profession to professionals who play 
sport (in this example) for large sums of money. 
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professions.53 They argued that professions have become 
unaffordable, have become antiquated, restrict access to their 
knowledge, underperform, and are inscrutable.54 This is certainly 
true of the legal profession. 
We must not lose sight of the fact that the notion that a 
profession provides a service to society has been, and remains, a 
prominent feature in many discussions about professions. This is a 
consistent trait (for want of a better term) of professions. Lawyers 
take pride in being labelled professionals because the label comes 
with such privileges as status, respect, and being able to self-
regulate. A profession that accepts the prestige associated with its 
professional status should not accept those benefits without meeting 
its concomitant obligations of maintaining the ideals of 
professionalism in practice. If it loses what distinguishes it as a 
profession, then it is in danger of losing the benefits of a profession. 
In the next two Parts of this paper, I illustrate how far the law 
business has strayed from its professional roots and how it has 
become a business. I argue that this failure of the legal profession is 
in large part because of a mutation in other precepts of a profession; 
namely its ability to self-regulate, and to set its own entry 
requirements. These constructs have enabled lawyers to establish a 
monopoly (with all that entails) over the provision of legal services. 
Part III examines the way the monopoly has been established and 
how it operates. Part IV details the depths to which law has become 
a business. Part V details the pressures that are being exerted on and 
disrupting the legal services business, and Part VI sets out what the 
effects of this disruption might have on the legal services industry. 
III.  LAWYERS HAVE A MONOPOLY ON LEGAL SERVICES 
This Part outlines the monopoly that lawyers have in providing 
legal services in Part III.A. It then discusses some purported benefits 
of monopolies in Part III.B and some of the known detriments of 
monopolies in III.C. 
                                                 
 53 SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 36. 
 54 Id. at 33–37. 
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A. The Lawyer Monopoly 
The notion that the legal profession holds a monopoly on 
providing legal services is well established.55 I discuss it here for 
several reasons: first, to highlight the problems that can arise 
because of the protections that a profession affords; second, to 
discuss the problems inherent in monopolies that have become 
obvious in the legal services industry; and, third, as a lead into the 
discussion about law becoming a business in Part IV. I argue that 
this monopoly, enabled by the structures put in place to protect the 
profession, has mutated the profession and has allowed lawyers to 
turn the profession into a business. 
The monopoly that the legal profession holds over the provision 
of legal services derives from the very fact that law is a profession. 
As discussed in Part II, professions are self-regulated. Crain, who at 
the time the article was written was Professor of Law at the 
University of North Carolina, argued that this “[a]uthority to self-
regulate is founded upon the esoteric character of professional 
knowledge, which in turn makes it difficult for the public to assess 
performance or for the government to regulate it.”56 The legal 
profession is self-regulating for these very reasons. Law is esoteric; 
lawyers argue that only they could possibly understand its 
complexity and intricacies enough to regulate it.57 The structure of a 
profession as an autonomous self-regulating entity that sets its own 
entry requirements inherently leads to its members holding a 
monopoly on providing professional services.58 Looked at another 
                                                 
 55 See sources cited supra note 14. 
 56 Crain, supra note 13, at 548–49. Additionally, Part V of this article discusses 
how new technologies are surpassing human knowledge and performance in legal 
domains and that this element of a profession should no longer be a reason for 
lawyers to maintain a self-regulating profession. 
 57 Eliot Freidson, Theory and the Professions, 64 IND. L.J. 423, 427 (1989). In 
Australia, the monopoly is affirmed in the various pieces of legislation regulating 
legal practice. See, e.g., Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) ss 5, 10, 43 
(Austl.) (prohibiting an entity from engaging in legal practice unless it is legal 
practitioner or law practice authorized under the Uniform Law). 
 58 See BARTLETT, supra note 14, at 7; see also DAL PONT, supra note 7, at 7. 
This is not a monopoly in that there is only one company providing goods or 
services in a market, but a broader conception of a monopoly over the provision 
of legal services. Nevertheless, it is still possible to extrapolate from the theories 
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way, these controls also form barriers to entry to the profession.59 
The legal profession has created this monopoly for its services and 
has maintained it since around the fifteenth century.60 Bartlett argued 
that “the law business is a monopoly in the sense that competitive 
access is limited by artificial entry barriers and its practitioners, 
enjoying monopoly profits, suffer from the monopolist’s destructive 
self-satisfaction . . . .”61 Crain argued that the monopoly created by 
self-regulating professions such as law extended to “an economic 
monopoly over recruitment, training, and credentialing, a political 
monopoly over areas of expertise, and an administrative monopoly 
over determining what standards shall apply to practitioners.”62 
Lawyers have deliberately asserted and maintained this 
monopoly over access to the law. As a small example, until recently 
lawyers fostered a shibboleth in the use of Latin to restrict access to 
legal knowledge. McLeod noted that the use of Latin in law was 
“also a symbol of a profession. Latin adds to the mystery of the law. 
It adds to the difficulty in accessing the law. It keeps the profession 
separate from other parts of society, perhaps more now than it ever 
did.”63 Perhaps because of this, proponents of plain English in law 
have for some time now advocated to reject Latinisms for the very 
reason that it excludes those external to the legal monopoly from 
accessing the law.64 
B. Benefits of Monopolies 
Some commentators argue that monopolies, in general sense, 
can increase economic efficiency. For example, Barzel argued that, 
                                                 
of monopolies in relation to monopoly pricing and failure to innovate. See infra 
Part V. 
 59 BARTLETT, supra note 14, at 16. 
 60 ROSS, supra note 5, at 58. 
 61 BARTLETT, supra note 14, at 7. 
 62 Crain, supra note 13, at 548–49. 
 63 Peter R. Macleod, Latin in Legal Writing: An Inquiry into the Use of Latin in 
the Modern Legal World, 39 B.C. L. REV. 235, 250 (1997) (citing LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 263 (1975)). 
 64 See Debra R. Cohen, Competent Legal Writing—A Lawyer’s Professional 
Responsibility, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 491, 506 (1999). Perhaps the plain English 
movement might be seen as the first technology aimed at undermining the 
monopoly. 
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at the commodity level, monopolies can lead to increased output and 
lower prices.65 To use the example of a law firm, the full resources 
of the firm could be used to produce the monopolist product—say, 
some expertise in the law as it applies to a particular industry.66 
Another, less convincing, argument in favor of monopolies is that a 
monopoly can be used to avoid “the resource waste involved in 
competition among innovators.”67 
Some of the reasons proffered for maintaining the monopoly that 
the legal profession holds over the provision of legal services 
include that it ensures confidence in the rule of law, quality of 
service, and “professionalism.”68 Other arguments put forward 
include that it preserves the separation of powers and the rights of 
citizens in a democracy.69 Lawyers have fostered this monopoly, and 
lawyers guard it. This has led to criticisms of conflicts of interest—
criticisms that are routinely rejected by the profession.70 However, 
the problems associated with the monopoly over legal services run 
deeper than conflicts of interest. 
C. Problems Associated with Monopolies 
While the arguments above can be made in favor of monopolies, 
much more has been written, and laws have been enacted,71 because 
of the detrimental effects of monopolies. Susskind and Susskind 
                                                 
 65 Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 
354 (1968). 
 66 BARTLETT, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that expertise in Wall Street firms that 
consistently deal with the Securities Exchange Commission, and stating that “[i]t 
is impossible for most lawyers to acquire the sensitivity to securities regulation 
problems that a partner in a large Wall Street firm has at his fingertips.”). 
 67 Barzel, supra note 65, at 354. 
 68 See Montgomery, supra note 43, at 331 (citing A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATION 
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992)). 
 69 But see David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 799, 854–55 (1992) (dismissing these arguments as supporting lawyer 
independence). 
 70 See, e.g., Christine Parker, Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal 
Practice: Autonomy and Responsiveness, 25 U.N.S.W.L.J. 676, 693 (2002) 
(“[T]he mainly self-regulatory nature of complaints investigation maintains the 
conflict between the legal professional association as ‘union’ and investigator-
prosecutor for its own members.”). 
 71 See, e.g., Competition and Consumer Act 2010, c 4 (Austl.). 
426 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 405 
touched on the problems associated with monopolies held by 
professions including the legal profession and decried the view that 
“many professional services are inefficient, too costly, and have yet 
to be subject to the overhaul that the great majority of other 
industries have endured.”72 They did not directly draw the 
connection between the structures inherent in a profession as the 
cause of the monopoly in the first place. Neither did they deal 
directly with the problems in the literature that monopolies cause, 
just their ultimate effect.73 It is therefore helpful to briefly touch on 
some monopoly theory to explain the impact that monopolies have 
had on the legal services market. 
Apart from the misallocation of resources that they cause,74 there 
are two other major problems with monopolies. First, they allow the 
monopolist to charge monopoly prices to extract a super profit. In 
law, there are constant reminders of this overcharging by lawyers.75 
It has been subject to almost universal criticism76 but this has largely 
                                                 
 72 SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 34. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See, for example, the comments by Justice Finkelstein about the 
misallocation of resources caused by monopolies in Application by Chime 
Communications Pty Ltd [No.2] (2009) ACompT 2 (Austl.). 
 75 See, e.g., Fiona Hudson, Lawyer Banned Until 2020 for Excessively 
Overcharging Clients, HERALD SUN (June 1, 2014), 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/lawyer-banned-until-2020-for-
excessively-overcharging-clients/news-
story/3ebca0807a94b231b6b5aad4155284e5 (citing instances of overcharging by 
lawyers); Richard Ackland, Small Cases, Big Bills: Keddies Working Overtime to 
Kill Complaints, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/small-cases-big-bills-
keddies-working-overtime-to-kill-complaints-20111117-1nl5m.html (providing 
details concerning a multi-million dollar lawsuit against an Australian law firm 
on grounds the firm overcharged clients); Gino Dal Pont, Charging for Access to 
Justice, VICTORIAN L. INST. J. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.liv.asn.au/Staying-
Informed/LIJ/LIJ/September-2017/Charging-For-Access-To-Justice 
(“Overcharging damages the reputation of the legal profession.”). 
 76 In Simic v Norton [2017] 1007 FamCA 3 (Austl.), his honor, addressing costs 
up front, said “the consequences of obscenely high legal costs are destructive of 
the emotional, social and financial wellbeing of the parties and their children. It 
must stop.” Id.; see also Steve Mark, Billing Complaints—Are You 
Overcharging?, Presentation to the Best Billing Practice Legalwise Seminar, 
Sydney (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/Documents/billing_compl
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not changed the billing practices that foster the overcharging in the 
first place.77 Second, monopolies cause a deadweight loss to 
society;78 that is, the amount of product or service that could be 
provided at a lower price that the monopolist does not produce, and 
is not then available to the consumer who cannot afford the 
monopoly price for the service. In law firms, we see this as the legal 
services that would ordinarily be provided or consumed by society 
but that, because the price is too high, is not consumed by 
anybody—particularly those who can least afford it.79 This has 
caused an enormous problem that is characterized as a problem of 
access to justice, but it can also be characterized as a deadweight 
loss caused by the lawyer monopoly. 
Thirdly, there is no incentive for the monopolist to innovate to 
provide a better or more cost effective service. Indeed, Sheremata, 
                                                 
aints_are_you_overcharging.pdf (“[C]osts continue to be the most complained 
about issue at the OLSC. In 2006 – 2007, costs complaints comprised of 24% of 
all the written complaints we received. Of these complaints overcharging 
continues to be the most complained about issue in relation to costs (9.1%). This 
has been the case for many years now.”). 
 77 I discuss the billing practices of the vast majority of law firms in Part IV. In 
discussions about billing practices while I was in practice, a common refrain was 
that “it is hard to argue against the business model of a person who makes $1 
million a year.” 
 78 See Posner, supra note 16, at 807. 
 79 This deadweight loss leads to a problem in that people cannot afford to obtain 
legal services. In 2016, the American Bar Association found that: 
1. Most people living in poverty, and the majority of moderate-
income individuals, do not receive the legal help they need . . . .  
2. The public often does not obtain effective assistance with legal 
problems, either because of insufficient financial resources or a 
lack of knowledge about when legal problems exist that require 
resolution through legal representation . . . . 
3. The vast number of unrepresented parties in court adversely 
impacts all litigants, including those who have representation. 
4. Many lawyers, especially recent law graduates, are unemployed 
or underemployed despite the significant unmet need for legal 
services . . . . 
A.B.A., REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 11–
16 (2016) [hereinafter FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 
REPORT], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016F
LSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf. 
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Associate Professor of Policy at York University in Canada, argued 
that “[m]onopolistic market structure[s] interact with network 
externalities to produce barriers to innovation.”80 The American Bar 
Association Legal Futures Report noted that: 
The billable hour model, which enables lawyers to earn more money if 
they spend more time on a matter, arguably provides less of an incentive 
to develop more efficient delivery methods than other ways to charge for 
services (for example, flat fees). This model also does not easily allow 
for innovations in scalability, branding, marketing, and technology that 
are found in most industries.81 
The billing practices of law firms provide a good example of 
both a monopolist charging monopoly prices, and of the failure of 
monopolists to innovate. Nearly all law firms charge clients for the 
time that they spend on their matters in six minute increments.82 This 
has led to malaise in the legal profession that Susskind and Susskind 
recognized in all professions;83 that “in most situations in which 
professional help is called for, what is made available may be 
adequate, good, or even great, but rarely is it world-class.”84 Despite 
this, the lawyers’ monopoly over providing legal services has led 
directly to the profession becoming a business. It is worthwhile to 
reiterate the irony that the traits, or tenets, that mark out law as a 
profession that were spelled out in Part II have led directly to 
lawyers holding a monopoly. This has, in turn, led to law becoming 
a business with all of the problems that entail, as set out in Part IV. 
In a further irony, this business is incapable of displaying the ideals 
of a profession set out in Part II. 
IV.  LAW AS A BUSINESS 
This Part outlines how the structures through which law is 
practiced have evolved to exacerbate the push for profit. In Part 
IV.A, I argue that the partnership model itself promotes internal 
                                                 
 80 Willow A. Sheremata, Barriers to Innovation: A Monopoly, Network 
Externalities, and the Speed of Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 937, 972 (1997) 
(emphasis added). 
 81 FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 79, at 16. 
 82 Kirby, supra note 48, at 258–59. In this way, firms are able to capture even 
the most inconsequential work. 
 83 SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 33–37. 
 84 Id. at 36. 
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competition for greater profits. In Part IV.B, I describe how the push 
by law firm partners for greater profits has increased since around 
the 1950s. In Part IV.C, I show how this desire for profit has 
changed the practice of law from a profession to a business, and in 
Part IV.D, I give the example of incorporated legal practices as the 
epitome of this change. 
A. The Partnership Structure 
Whatever view one takes about the merits of the practice of law 
becoming a business, it clearly has done so.85 As discussed in Part 
III, there has been no incentive for the monopolist law firms to 
decrease prices, to innovate, or to improve service to their 
customers. An example of the sameness of the provision of legal 
services is the model through which lawyers have chosen to provide 
their services—the partnership.86 The structure adopted by most law 
firm partnerships can be viewed as a pyramid: there are a limited 
number of partners at the top of the pyramid who control the 
business, and, underneath these partners are employed lawyers of 
varying experience and expertise who are encouraged to clamor for 
partnership by meeting billing targets. George Beaton noted that 
early in the 20th Century, Paul Cravath of Cravath, Swaine & Moore 
LLP invented the “foundation for the contemporary BigLaw 
business model.”87 That is, the structure of partners operating a 
                                                 
 85 Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law 
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 465, 466 (2008). 
 86 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the number of lawyers employed by 
partnerships). 
 87 See Beaton, supra note 21. This is sometimes referred to as the Cravath model 
after the system developed in the early part of the 20th Century by Paul Cravath 
of Cravath, Swaine and Moore LLP. The firm’s website states that: 
In the early twentieth century, when Paul Cravath was a young lawyer, 
the structure of American law firms was quite different from today’s. 
Associates were often trained as apprentices to another solo practitioner, 
and made a living based on the clients that they could bring into their 
practice. Paul Cravath recognized the inefficiency and shortcomings 
inherent in that prevailing law firm structure and decided he wanted to 
change it. 
The System’s History, CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, 
https://www.cravath.com/systemshistory/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
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partnership model where associates work to become partners from 
within the firm in a competitive environment. 
Because lawyers have a monopoly on legal services and clients 
must use lawyers for legal advice, law firms have been able to 
charge monopoly prices for their services. Partners in a law firm take 
a share of the profit generated (the amount of revenue minus costs). 
This drives all the activities of the firm toward creating maximum 
profit to share between the partners. In a partnership, there is no 
requirement to distribute profits other than to the partners—such as 
to investors for example—and all profits can be distributed at the 
partners’ choosing. That is, the partners can choose to divert all of 
the profits to themselves and not to reinvest into the business. 
Profit can be increased in a number of ways, for example, by 
increasing the amount charged for the service or by reducing the 
costs incurred to provide that service. However, the typically small 
group of partners at the top of the partnership pyramid cannot create 
maximum profit by themselves. Profit at the top of the pyramid is 
created by “leveraging”88 the amount charged out by those below 
them on the pyramid. Therefore, legal practice has become a game 
of mathematics where revenue equals the number of fee earners 
multiplied by hours billed per day, multiplied by the charge out rate, 
multiplied by the number of days in the year. Generally, increasing 
any one of these components increases the size of profit (depending 
on cost increases). It is not possible to increase the number of days 
in a year, so to increase profit, partners must increase either (or both) 
charge out rates or hours billed.89 In that way, increasing the 
leverage, by increasing the number of junior lawyers and their 
                                                 
 88 Sean Larkan, Low Leverage: A Low Road to Ruin for Law Firms?, 6 EDGE 
INT’L REV., no. 2, 2011, at 21, 21 (2011), https://www.legalleadersblog.com/ 
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charge out rates, results in increased partner profit. Similarly, the 
more hours billed by the junior lawyers, the more profit is created. 
B. The Push for Profit 
Because lawyers have had a monopoly on providing legal 
services for so long, lawyer costs have spiraled upward. It is now 
common to see competitions within firms over hours billed, either 
in the form of overt competition tables or simply by publishing 
hours billed weekly by each employee. This pressure on lawyers to 
maintain or increase hours billed again leads to unhealthy work 
practices. There is little wonder that the general public sees lawyers 
as greedy90 and psychopathic.91 This incentive to bill creates some 
perverse behaviors. For example, the longer it takes to complete a 
job the higher the bill and the better it is for the individual lawyer 
and the firm. A solicitor who takes longer to complete jobs will 
appear more valuable to a firm than a solicitor who completes jobs 
quickly.92 As Justice Kirby noted, “[t]he system of billable hours can 
reward the slow-witted lawyer. It can penalize the experienced, wise 
and efficient.”93 Similarly, it must be hard for junior lawyers to resist 
the urge at times to put the thumb on the scale and charge just one 
more unit per matter in order to make their individual monthly 
budgets. Also, the annual pay increase discussion for employed 
lawyers is immovably tied to, and is more than covered by, an 
increased charge out rate. 
                                                 
 90 See, e.g., Stephen Glover, A Plague on Lawyers: Stephen Glover’s 
Blisteringly Provocative Critique on the Greed, Self-Importance and Lack of 
Scruples of Britain’s Last Unreformed Vested Interest Group, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 
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This trend towards increasing partner profits gained impetus in 
the United States around 1985 when the magazine The American 
Lawyer began publishing the annual profit per partner figures for 
law firms.94 Instead of competition leading to reduced prices as one 
might expect in a healthy competitive environment, the competition 
among law firms has become to increase profits per partner. Thirst 
for greater personal profits leads people to act in certain ways and it 
is no accident that partner incomes increase year upon year.95 These 
metrics of firm performance have themselves become a commodity. 
Thomson Reuters, for example, provides “competitive legal 
benchmarking” on law firms around the world on its “Peer Monitor” 
platform.96 Currell and Henderson use the returns to partners as their 
measure of law firm success. They reason that this is “because 
industry health is generally measured by market value or profits, not 
by total employment or whether everyone who wants a job can get 
one on the terms they want.”97 Conversely, I suggest that this 
approach to measuring success in the legal profession is precisely 
why the profession is in such dire circumstances. 
This focus on profit sharing among groups of lawyers has driven 
an unhealthy approach to the provision of legal services. To become 
a partner, a lawyer must demonstrate a consistent level of client 
billings. If billing clients large sums of money is the incentive to 
lawyers’ progress within the firm, then this is exactly what will 
happen. Sometimes, though, despite lawyers reaching billing 
benchmarks, partners will seek to maintain the extreme profits of the 
partnership for themselves and often make joining the partnership a 
                                                 
 94 See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The Last Days of Big Law, NEW REPUBLIC (July 
21, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113941/big-law-firms-trouble-when-
money-dries. 
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continuously disappearing horizon for these lawyers. This can lead 
to the senior lawyers in a firm becoming disenchanted. 
This quest for profit has diverted the legal profession from its 
professional roots and it has become a business instead. I do not 
mean to say, and neither could I, that all lawyers within firms have 
lost their professional character. There is a worrying, and perhaps 
growing, perception of lawyers as greedy and sharp, and this is 
leading clients to look for alternatives. Those on the outside of the 
law firm tent are more than happy to provide those alternatives and 
to disrupt the BigLaw model. 
C. Law Firm Statistics Show that Law has Become a Business 
We should not let BigLaw define the entire legal profession.98 
There are many sole practitioners, community legal centres, Legal 
Aid lawyers and not-for-profit legal service providers that truly do 
exist to provide a service to the community. However, lawyers are 
predominantly employed in law firms. There are 1,338,678 lawyers 
in the United States,99 which means that there is one lawyer for every 
244 people.100 It is difficult to get an accurate picture of the number 
                                                 
 98 See George Beaton, Will It be the LPOs That Drive #BigLaw Business Model 
Change?, BEATON CAP. (June 22, 2012), http://www.beatoncapital.com 
/2012/06/will-it-be-the-lpos-that-drive-biglaw-business-model-change/. 
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ones ~$100million . . . . (From the perspective of a single jurisdiction, 
like Australia for example, perhaps 30-40 firms constitute #BigLaw.). 
Id. 
 99 See A.B.A., ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: LAWYER 
POPULATION BY STATE (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad
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Bureau. United States: 2018 Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
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ERP (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
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of lawyers employed in law firms,101 but one account estimates that 
it is approximately 75%.102 In Australia, where, because of the 
smaller market more fine-grained figures are recorded, a similar 
proportion of lawyers in law firms is observed. On this closer 
analysis, it is clear that law firms are the dominant employer of 
lawyers. A report on the profile of lawyers in Australia conducted 
for the New South Wales Law Society by Urbis in 2016 showed that, 
in October 2016 there were 71,509 lawyers in Australia.103 Around 
70% (or 50,000) of these lawyers were employed in private 
practice.104 Further, 70% of these lawyers worked in a law firm of 
between 2 and 40+ partners. These figures indicate that it is the law 
firm model that employs by far the most lawyers and thus should 
attract most attention. 
Law firms are typically divided by reference to their size. The 
world’s largest law firms are in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.105 Through mergers (both international and local), some 
of the world’s largest law firms have become mega law firms with 
over $2 billion in revenue.106 Large firms continue to amalgamate 
and take over smaller firms around the world and a growing number 
of ultra large law firms now conduct business on a global scale. In 
                                                 
 101 For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics published data on the group 
“Legal Services.” See NAICS 541100 – Legal Services, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 
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the protected environment within the monopoly on legal services, 
law firms have been able to form these cartels among firms that have 
now developed law as a multi-billion dollar business.107 From his 
window, it would be difficult for the man on the Clapham omnibus 
to perceive the tenets of professionalism in these multinational 
firms. 
D. Incorporated Legal Practices 
Another more recent aspect of law firms that shows the shift 
from law as a profession to law as a business is the incorporated 
legal practice. In the United States, paragraph (d) of Rule 5.4 of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct restricts ownership of law 
firms to lawyers. This applies also to law firms set up as Professional 
Limited Liability Companies (PLLCs) that operate on a similar basis 
to normal limited liability companies that cannot issue stock. In 
other jurisdictions, legal practices or firms of lawyers have been 
allowed to incorporate and issue shares in the incorporated entity, 
for example, in the United Kingdom since 2007, and Australia since 
2001.108 This takes the law as a business model one step further away 
from a profession. Rationales for this practice include that it limits 
liability for partners for the wrongs of their co-partners and gives 
autonomy to partners in law firms to choose the structure under 
which they operate.109 However, other reasons are more financial in 
nature and include to “reduce tax on law firm profits . . . [build] a 
capital base for expansion . . . and [create] a more efficient and 
effective management structure.”110 Thornton argued that this 
initiative to allow law firms to incorporate “reveals perhaps more 
clearly than any other the extent to which legal practice has been 
imbued with the spirit of competition, which threatens to leave 
professionalism languishing in the rear. Shareholders, after all, are 
                                                 
 107 Beaton, supra note 98. 
 108 See Legal Profession Amendment (Incorporated Legal Practices) Act 2000 
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primarily investors interested in maximizing the return on their 
investment.”111 
The incorporated partnership is often ultimately still controlled 
by the same group—the partners of the firm. Being a partner in a 
monopoly law firm provides no training for success as a business 
person. In 2007, Slater and Gordon was the first law firm in the 
world to go public.112 In 2010, Andrew Grech, formerly the Chief 
Executive of Slater and Gordon, noted: 
that the profession is increasingly embracing the concept of conducting 
the business of a law practice through the incorporated legal practice 
model . . . should be no surprise when the benefits are considered. These 
include limited liability, less disruptive entry and exit from ownership, 
the inclusion of non-lawyer owners as contributors to the success of the 
enterprise, and greater capacity to raise debt and equity.113 
None of those proposed benefits mention a better or more 
efficient service to clients or the tenets of professionalism. Mr. 
Grech continued: “Incorporation has a number of advantages, but it 
highlights the tensions between the role of the legal profession in the 
administration of justice and upholding the rule of law, and the 
demands on legal practitioners who are also charged with 
responsibility for conducting a successful business enterprise.”114 
In 2017, ten years after Slater and Gordon initially went public 
in pursuit of its “successful business enterprise[,]” its share price 
collapsed, and it was acquired by a consortium of international 
hedge funds.115 In relation to Slater and Gordon’s demise, Adele 
Ferguson in the Sydney Morning Herald noted that: 
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Slater and Gordon went on a debt-fuelled acquisition binge that almost 
destroyed it. But along the way it forgot its core values, which include 
deep ties with the labour movement and representing the underdog, the 
victim. 
Britain is a tough market, with a number of Australian companies losing 
a fortune. Hubris and greed would add Slater and Gordon to the list.116 
Technology played no part in Slater and Gordon’s demise but 
hubris and greed did. This change to law as a business, as 
exemplified by Slater and Gordon’s, has eroded the professional 
character of the legal profession and the professionalism of lawyers. 
It is no surprise then that it is the dysfunctional business model of 
the law firm that disruptive enterprises have targeted. It is not 
technology alone that will mean the end of the profession, which, as 
discussed, has been in a long decline brought about in part by the 
very structures through which it is practiced. What is left to disrupt 
is the BigLaw business model. 
There are now at least five broad forces working towards 
disrupting the legal practice market. As discussed, the problems 
facing the profession, now in the form of disruption from NewLaw 
and new technologies, derive in part from the change from law as a 
profession to law as a business after years of monopolist practices. 
This drive for profit has forced a reaction from clients as consumers 
of legal services. There are a number of clear trends in the legal 
services market now that make it ripe for disruption from smaller, 
more nimble suppliers. 
V.  FIVE FACTORS DISRUPTING THE LAW FIRM MODEL 
As noted in Parts III and IV, the legal profession, with its 
monopoly on providing legal services, has become a business. This 
Part identifies five factors that, together, have begun to disrupt the 
legal services business. Predominant among these forces is the 
pressure that clients are exerting on law firms to charge less and to 
use alternative fee models (AFM) such as fixed fees and retainer 
agreements. However, there are a number of other interrelated 
trends impacting the way big firms are having to deliver their 
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services, that is: increasing numbers of NewLaw providers, the 
increase in law graduates, the explosion in the number and types of 
new technologies directed at law,117 and the freer access to the law 
itself—what I call the “AustLII effect” and which is explained in 
Part V.E below. This presents a threat to the incumbent legal service 
providers, because it dilutes the legal profession’s monopoly. 
Furlong noted the danger that the legal profession was failing to 
maintain relevance.118 He argued that there were two preconditions 
for the profession to maintain its privileged status: “First, the 
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer guild and the society it 
served had to remain intact; second, lawyers had to be the only 
viable option for the provision of legal services.”119 I have discussed 
the failure of the profession to maintain its professional roots— 
Furlong’s first precondition. The second condition proffered by 
Furlong is also, as discussed in this Part, under extreme threat from 
a number of forces that are operating to destroy the monopoly and 
allow other providers into the market for legal services. 
It will take perhaps a generation to completely destroy the 
monopoly. Frey and Osborne argued that change at this scale was 
difficult, not because of “the lack of inventive ideas that set the 
boundaries for economic development, but rather powerful social 
and economic interests promoting the technological status quo.”120 
Law is a profession with a long history and deep and entrenched 
interests in maintaining the status quo and holds great influence on 
political power. However, disruption is insistent and, in the case of 
the legal services industry, multi-faceted. 
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A. Client Reactions to Overcharging 
Under the protection of the monopoly, lawyers and law firms 
have been able to overcharge for legal services. Clients have begun 
to respond to this behavior in a number of significant ways. In an 
extreme example, in 2017, a Silicon Valley company, tired of 
paying the fees charged by law firms, created its own law firm and 
intends to use new technologies to streamline the work previously 
performed by their external lawyers.121 Corporate clients are also 
trying to minimize legal spending in other, less dramatic ways, 
including, as discussed below, reducing the amount they spend on 
external lawyers and doing more work in-house using new 
technologies and freer access to the law. 
Reducing the Amount Spent on Lawyers 
Furlong noted that “the longstanding asymmetry of knowledge 
between lawyers and clients is rebalancing fast, and this will realign 
the power dynamics between the two just as quickly.”122 As an 
example, powerful and tech-savvy clients such as Microsoft are 
already withdrawing legal work from traditional law firm suppliers 
and demanding alternative models of legal service delivery.123 
Currently around 60% of Microsoft’s external legal matters are dealt 
with by firms using fee structures other than the traditional billable 
hour. Microsoft intends to increase that to 90% within two years.124 
How law firms will respond to this push from corporate clients is 
still unknown but reports of heavy discounting of legal bills are 
beginning to emerge that may provide some clues.125  
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This is an international phenomenon. For example, in 2014, the 
Canadian Bar Association published a report titled Futures: 
Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada. The 
Futures report noted that clients were calling for lower legal costs 
and certainty in billing.126 These changes are having an effect on the 
lawyers’ monopoly too, as large law firms are being forced to 
innovate to retain clients. 
As discussed in Part III, a lack of incentive to innovate is a 
recognized problem with monopolies.127 That law firms are 
responding to client pressure on fees and seeking to innovate may 
indicate that the monopoly is dissipating. The 2017 State of the 
Legal Market report noted that: “many firms have added or elevated 
innovation as a major element of their business strategy. There is no 
uniform approach, but many firms are experimenting with 
innovation committees, shark-tank-type innovation competitions, 
hackathons, app development and incubators.”128 
In-house counsel and other legally trained corporate advisers are 
also weaponized by the easy access to eager NewLaw lawyers who 
can use the latest legal technologies, but without the overheads. 
Work Moving In-House 
Increasingly, companies are bringing legal work in-house rather 
than spending on external law firms. In Australia, the 2017 Urbis 
Report noted an increase in the number of in-house legal counsel 
between 2011 and 2016 of over 45% from 7,325 to 11,675.129 
According to another report, this one prepared by Mahlab, on 
Corporate Counsel, the impact of growing in-house teams within 
corporations: 
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is significant and ongoing. The big law firms are meeting these 
challenges by reshaping their services to offer more flexible fee 
structures and increase efficiency, and relying on outsourcing (usually 
offshore) to provide more streamlined and cost-effective offerings. 
However, there has been a circa 30% decrease in briefs to private law 
firms, with the average individual external legal spend by Australian 
corporations now sitting well below AUD $2 million. External lawyers 
are generally sought for specialist advice on key projects or for the 
firepower required for a multi-million or billion dollar transaction. Even 
then, corporations are flexing muscle, hiring specialists in order to keep 
the work in-house.130 
In-house counsel can themselves also use new technologies that 
are able to interrogate the laws and provide concise advice far faster 
than law firms. In response, law firms continue to look for ways to 
retain clients by offering reduced fees and by themselves adopting 
new technologies. 
B. Too Many Lawyers 
In 2016, The New York Times reported that after access to loans 
to students was made freer in 2006, “[l]aw schools jacked up tuition 
and accepted more students, even after the legal job market stalled 
and shrank in the wake of the recession.”131 This resulted in two 
outcomes, a “drastic drop in law school applications since 2011 . . . 
[and that] to maintain enrolment numbers, law schools have had to 
lower their admissions standards and take even more unqualified 
students.”132 Note that they did not reduce the number of law 
students entering law schools from those numbers inflated after 
2006. In 2016, the American Bar Association issued its Report on 
the Future of Legal Services in the United States133 which noted that 
“data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that 
unemployment for recent law graduates remains significantly higher 
compared to the national average across other labor categories.”134 
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Jordon Furlong highlighted “a total population of unemployed and 
underemployed American lawyers in the tens of thousands, one that 
swells a little more every year.”135 
In a similar trend, the number of law graduates in Australia has 
increased significantly in the past 20 years,136 and this trend is set to 
continue.137 Australia now has 39 Law Schools, some of which have 
intakes in first year of over 1,200 students. 138 In 2015, after reports 
that the number of law graduates in Australia had increased to 
around 15,000, the Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD) 
sought to assuage concerns by publishing the “actual” number of 
law graduates in 2015 as only 7,583.139 Whatever the correct figure 
is, the number is arguably greater than is required by existing law 
firms. 
As discussed in Part IV, there are now 71,509 lawyers in 
Australia—or 1 lawyer for every 343 people. On one reckoning, 
continually increasing the number of lawyers in the market reduces 
the profit available to, and dilutes the market dominance of, 
incumbent law firms. This is in fact what we are witnessing as the 
increased number of NewLaw suppliers that are stemming from this 
rash of new law graduates eats into the legal services market 
dominated by BigLaw.140 
                                                 
 135 Furlong, supra note 28, at 417. 
 136 Thornton, supra note 111, at 266–67; ROSS, supra note 5, at 72; Woelert & 
Croucher, supra note 26, at 491–94. 
 137 Gwilym Croucher & Peter Woelert, How Australia Got So Many Law 
Schools, UNIV. MELBOURNE, https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/how-
australia-got-so-many-law-schools (last visited June 22, 2018). 
 138 See Australia’s Law Schools, STUDYING LAW IN AUSTL., 
https://cald.asn.au/slia/australias-law-schools/  (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
 139 COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN LAW DEANS, DATA REGARDING LAW SCHOOL 
GRADUATE NUMBERS AND OUTCOMES (2015), https://cald.asn.au/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Factsheet-Law_Students_in_Australia-1.pdf. 
 140 At every law and technology function I have attended recently, I have met 
another young lawyer more than willing to show me his or her newly developed 
app that can perform anything from preparing a will to providing tax advice. For 
example, at one recent event, I met Adrian Cartland, a young lawyer who 
established Ailira. See Ailira, CARTLAND L., https://www.cartlandlaw.com/ailira/ 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019). Ailira is touted as the “first law firm without lawyers.” 
See Emma Ryan, Law Firm Without Lawyers Opens Its Doors, LAW. WKLY. 
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C. NewLaw and Non-Law 
This oversupply of lawyers leads to the next pressure on the big 
law firm monopoly on providing legal services; new entrants to the 
market, eager to provide an alternative model to the law firm, have 
begun to make inroads into the legal services business. In the 
following subparts of Part V.C, I describe some of the disruptive 
forces affecting the market, including NewLaw providers, those 
who are not lawyers but are now able to provide services that law 
firms used typically to provide, and the growing prevalence of 
onshoring and offshoring that law firms can now use to cut down on 
overheads and duplication. 
NewLaw 
There are almost daily reports of new NewLaw legal service 
providers entering the market.141 The term NewLaw was coined in 
2013 by Beaton Capital analyst Eric Chin,142 who described them 
thus: 
These firms are designed around virtual work spaces and rely on the rise 
of supertemps. Supertemps are lawyers who have been trained by 
traditional BigLaw firms who are now looking for flexible work 
arrangements. These alternative business model (ABM) legal services 
providers are able to provide the same or similar service levels to 
BigLaw—but at or below incumbents’ break-even points.143 
The idea of what NewLaw is has evolved in the last four years 
to include a range of start-up firms or sole practitioners that provide 
legal services in innovative ways using (either new or existing) 
                                                 
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/sme-law/22256-law-firm-
without-lawyers-opens-its-doors. 
 141 For example, see generally the reports on ARTIFICIAL LAW., 
https://www.artificiallawyer.com/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
 142 Eric Chin, 2018: The Year Axiom Becomes the World’s Largest Legal 
Services Firm, BEATON CAP. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.beatoncapital.com/ 
2013/09/2018-year-axiom-becomes-worlds-largest-legal-services-firm/. 
 143 Id. This is the textbook definition of disruption. See Christensen, Raynor & 
McDonald, supra note 1, at 46. 
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technology.144 NewLaw providers include LegalZoom145 and 
RocketLawyer146 in the United States, and LawPath and Nexus Law 
Group in Australia.147 LegalZoom and NexusLawyers provide 
lawyers on demand to deliver legal work at a contracted price 
outside of the traditional law firm partnership model. Because they 
do not have the overhead costs of law firm office space, employee 
costs, or law firm artworks, they are able to access and use the vast 
array of technology that is currently available to provide legal 
services at a significantly reduced cost. More and more lawyers who 
have become disillusioned with the fading prospects of partnership 
in traditional law firms are joining the ranks of NewLaw. These 
                                                 
 144 See Jordan Furlong & Sean Larkan, A Brief Inventory of NewLaw in 
Australia, AUSTL. LEGAL PRAC. MGMT. ASS’N (Aug. 25, 2014), 
https://www.alpma.com.au/a-survival-guide-for-legal-practice-
managers/inventory-of-new-law-in-Australia. 
 145 See LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/country/au (last visited Feb. 
8, 2019) (“LegalZoom provides the legal solutions you need to start a business, 
run a business, file a trademark application, make a will, create a living trust, file 
bankruptcy, change your name, and handle a variety of other common legal 
matters for small businesses and families.”). 
 146 See ROCKET LAWYER, https://www.rocketlawyer.com/home.rl (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2019). RocketLawyer allows clients to type in a legal query which is 
answered by a lawyer within a network of lawyers around the United States who 
provide the advice at low cost. Id. The site also provides a document review 
system the same way or allows you to create a new document (such as a contract) 
quickly and easily online without the need for a lawyer. Id. 
 147 See NEXUS LAW GROUP, https://www.nexuslawyers.com.au/ (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2019). Nexus Law Group’s website claims that: 
OpenLaw™ is a unique cloud-based practice management system that 
connects a network of senior specialist lawyers into a single operating 
platform, allowing them to work together seamlessly as one firm for the 
benefit of the client. OpenLaw enables Nexus to connect high-end, 
independent expertise with clients under a ‘direct access model’, more 
cost effectively than traditionally structured firms. The system 
incentivises collaboration and specialisation, which results in better 
outcomes for both lawyers and clients, without traditional firm 
overheads. 
Id. 
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NewLaw providers are attractive to in-house lawyers who are under 
increasing pressure to reduce legal spending.148 
Non-law Legal Service Providers 
Another recent trend is the proliferation of alternative suppliers 
of services that were traditionally performed by law firms. These not 
only include the resurrected multi-disciplinary firms set up by the 
big four accounting firms,149 but, because of the ubiquity of new 
technology, also companies that were not traditionally seen as 
competitors to law firms who can now provide services that were 
traditionally performed by law firms. For example, ANZ bank now 
advertises that it can set up everything a business needs to create a 
modern company: 
ANZ Business Ready® powered by Honcho can turn your business idea 
into reality quickly and easily. In a few guided steps you can receive your 
ABN, register your business name, set up a website, organise banking 
for your business and more.150 
Many of these tasks were traditionally performed and charged 
for by law firms when new businesses sought their advice—for 
significantly more than $26 per month. This trend, aided by the 
availability of new technologies, looks set to continue to increase 
the pressure on law firms worldwide. Susskind and Susskind also 
reported that, in England: 
[R]esearch suggests that almost two thirds of individuals would prefer to 
receive legal help from high-street brands than from conventional law 
firms. The Co-Op Bank in England has said that it will offer legal 
services from around 350 of its bank branches, while other well-known 
non-legal businesses, like BT, the telecommunications company, and the 
AA, the motoring association, have also committed to providing a range 
of everyday legal services. The solo lawyer is under threat.151 
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 149 See Sol Dolor, Big Four Firm Launches Legal Services Market Assault, 
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https://www.anz.com.au/personal/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
 151 SUSSKIND, supra note 10, at 67 (internal citations omitted). 
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New technologies are making access to law more available, not 
only to the average citizens, but to other service providers who are 
able to perform legal tasks, once the domain of law firms, at a 
reduced cost and in an attractively packaged form. Although these 
new service providers sound ideal, one thing that might be lacking 
in this service arrangement from the client’s perspective, is the 
familiarity with the client’s business and ways of working that law 
firms have obtained because they have traditionally been the only 
provider. 
Offshoring and onshoring 
Another trend mostly evident in BigLaw firms is to “offshore”152 
everyday work to jurisdictions that provide services at a far cheaper 
price than paying junior lawyers. Some law firms now send 
document review, discovery or document drafting to providers in, 
say, India, who will often provide a better service for a much 
cheaper price. Firms are still working on client confidentiality and 
client legal privilege issues that arise so that they can send more 
work offshore in this way, but this trend is obviously attractive to 
reduce costs for a limited range of work for law firms. 
Another similar trend for multi-national firms is to onshore 
work. Onshoring is similar to offshoring but the firm sets up its own 
factory of paralegals, hired by the firm in a cheaper jurisdiction to 
do work provided by lawyers within the firm in offices around the 
world.153 This factory of paralegals can provide twenty-four-hour 
service and, because the workers are retained by the firm, issues of 
confidentiality and privilege do not arise. 
The ubiquity of new (and sometimes not-so-new) technologies 
has allowed NewLaw providers and non-lawyers to do increasing 
amounts of work that was traditionally performed by law firms. 
Examples of not-so-new technologies include the smartphone and 
the home computer. These devices are now incredibly powerful and 
                                                 
 152 See Alan S. Blinder & Alan B. Krueger, Alternative Measures of 
Offshorability: A Survey Approach,  J. LABOR ECON., Apr. 2013, at S117 
(estimating that approximately 23.6 percent of all professional and related 
occupations could be offshored). 
 153 See Loyita Worley, Outsourcing, Offshoring, Nearshoring, Onshoring – 
What’s Going On?, LEGAL INFO. MGMT., Apr. 2012, at 11. 
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versatile tools that have unlimited access to the internet and can 
allow providers of all types to access the law and provide legal 
services from anywhere in the world at any time. The increasingly 
available range of new technologies directed at the legal services 
market that can be accessed through these devices multiplies the 
impact on the traditional legal services providers. Without even 
discussing new technologies, these old(er) devices have also opened 
up the legal services market to almost anyone. Furlong coined the 
term self-navigators to describe: 
the growing population of people and businesses that make use of the 
developing suite of tools and providers outside of law firms - the 
emerging legal support ecosystem. These people and businesses are not 
engaged in traditional “self-representation”; they are simply taking on 
basic and straightforward aspects of the legal process while leaving the 
more complex issues to lawyers.154 
The diverse and growing range of NewLaw providers and the 
work being done by self-navigators and non-law firm providers 
continues to eat away at the law firm monopoly. 
D. New Technologies 
Susskind and Susskind argued that the high prices charged by 
lawyers because of their monopoly restricted access to the law. They 
argued that the increasing commoditization of traditional law jobs 
and new technology would combine to destroy the monopoly and 
end the profession. However, if we peel a layer more than Susskind 
and Susskind do,155 we can see that the problems associated with 
monopolies have created the very basis of, and the reasons for, the 
disruption of the legal profession. This fatal flaw in the historical 
structures of the profession and the way the structures have been 
manipulated by lawyers for nearly a century has left the profession 
open to disruption. This particular chink in the armor of the legal 
profession has nothing to do with technology. But it is the new 
technology that is being used to disrupt the business of law. 
There is already a proliferation of technology tools on the market 
that offer to make every aspect of legal practice faster, more 
accessible to a broader range of providers and clients, and more 
                                                 
 154 Furlong, supra note 28, at 428. 
 155 SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 33. 
448 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 405 
efficient.156 It is not the law nor lawyers that are being directly 
threatened but the law firm businesses that have been overcharging. 
The attacks are surgically directed at the very barriers to the legal 
service market identified earlier. They are driven by a reaction to the 
issues raised in this part but are directed to providing greater and 
cheaper access to the law. 
Rodney Brooks, Australian roboticist and Panasonic Professor 
of Robotics (emeritus) at MIT, identified the need for pragmatism 
when discussing the impact of new technologies and cited what has 
been termed Amara’s law: that “[w]e tend to overestimate the effect 
of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the 
long run.”157 While the potential of technology to disrupt the legal 
profession outlined in this Part is great, the work required to design, 
create, and train these tools is hard and laborious. Because law is a 
complicated social construct, technologists must conquer computer 
engineering bottlenecks in creative and social intelligence.158 
Artificial intelligence (AI) legal tools are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and have demonstrated an ability to undertake certain 
legal tasks traditionally within the sole purview of a lawyer or 
paralegal. The most prominent developments have occurred in the 
areas of document review in discovery159 and contract analysis,160 
                                                 
 156 Stanford Law School CodeX Index has collated 771 companies that provide 
technology for the legal services market. See Discover Legal Technology, STAN. 
L. SCH., https://techindex.law.stanford.edu/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
 157 Rodney Brooks, The Seven Deadly Sins of Predicting the Future of AI, 
RODNEY BROOKS (Sept. 7, 2017), https://rodneybrooks.com/the-seven-deadly-
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 158 Frey & Osborne, supra note 120, at 262. 
 159 See, e.g., RELATIVITY, https://www.relativity.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 
2019) (providing an example of an eDiscovery firm). 
 160 See, e.g., KIRA, https://kirasystems.com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (giving 
an example of a contract review firm); LAWGEEX, https://www.lawgeex.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2019) (providing an example of a contract review firm). 
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legal research,161 case outcome prediction,162 and expertise 
automation.163 
Document Review 
Law firms have embraced AI applications in the document 
review area. While document review processes, particularly in 
discovery, have been targeted for automation by various vendors in 
the past, new AI applications have been shown to enhance the 
process. Natural language processing (NLP), machine learning, and 
other AI techniques are being applied to many aspects of the contract 
life cycle, including discovery, analysis, and due diligence.164 These 
programs are able to process legal documents and identify contract 
provisions and critical data, including in non-standard formats like 
tables and forms. 
Machine learning is most often associated with e-discovery 
applications but also underpins contract analysis and case 
predictions.165 Machine learning is a sub-field of artificial 
intelligence which has advanced exponentially in the last twenty to 
thirty years because of increases in computer power, large available 
datasets, massive investment in learning and development, and 
better algorithms.166 Computers are now adept at processing vast 
amounts of data, such as cases and journal articles, and at retrieving 
relevant data more accurately and efficiently than a human lawyer.167 
Computer scientists are actively working on creating applications 
                                                 
 161 See, e.g., ROSS INTELLIGENCE, http://www.rossintelligence.com/ (last 
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that can recognize principles in legal judgments,168 and training 
computers to solve legal problems.169 Through a process of training 
machines to identify and classify certain characteristics of 
documents for example, the machine, once trained, can process a 
very large number of documents extremely quickly and much more 
efficiently than a room full of junior lawyers. In contract analytics, 
Kira Systems170 claims that “users consistently report time savings 
of 20–40% the first time using the software, and up to 90% or more 
with experience.”171 LawGeex claims that using its product to review 
contracts results in a time saving over more traditional methods of 
80% and a cost saving of 90%.172 LawGeex also conducted a test 
comparing the performance of AI against twenty human lawyers in 
reviewing standard non-disclosure agreements. The lawyers and 
LawGeex’s AI reviewed five non-disclosure agreements to identify 
risks in the terms of the agreement. The human lawyers were able to 
do this with 85% accuracy. The AI was 94% accurate. The human 
lawyers took on average 51 minutes to complete the review of the 
five agreements. The AI took 26 seconds.173 
Technology assisted review uses statistical models, natural 
language processing and machine learning to electronically classify 
                                                 
 168 See, e.g., Olga Shulayeva, Advaith Siddharthan & Adam Wyner, 
Recognizing Cited Facts and Principles in Legal Judgements, 25 ARTIF. INTELL. 
L. 107, 109–11 (2017) (reporting on studies using supervised machine learning to 
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 170 See KIRA, supra note 160. 
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 173 AI vs. Lawyers: The Ultimate Showdown, LAWGEEX, 
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842/images/LawGeex%20eBook%20Al%20vs%20Lawyers%202018.pdf. 
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documents based on input from expert reviewers.174 With repeated 
use, the program learns more sophisticated review techniques and 
becomes more adept at finding and collating only relevant 
documents. As these systems develop, they are increasingly 
accepted as not only more efficient than manual review but also as 
more accurate.175 
These are undoubtedly complex tasks, but it is likely that 
machines will quickly become better at these tasks than human 
lawyers. This document review was work that was traditionally done 
by teams of junior lawyers, holed up in data rooms for months at a 
time to review documents and then manually enter information into 
a report for the client. Law firms relished this type of work because 
they could bill the client for the work of the junior lawyers and make 
more profit. Junior lawyers would benefit from reviewing 
sometimes thousands of different legal documents and from meeting 
budget. Because of this, clients would pay handsomely for the 
review process. They are no longer willing to do so and if there are 
machines that can do the same, or a better, job with an 80% saving, 
then clients will insist on using the machines. This will indubitably 
affect the profits of law firms and firms will resist change for this 
reason. It will take a culture shift or an alternative billing model to 
convince lawyers to abandon the leveraging model. However, as 
discussed, these changes appear inexorable. 
Legal Research 
Another job traditionally given to junior lawyers was legal 
research. It was much cheaper for a junior lawyer to research the 
latest law on a given matter at a lower charge out rate than a partner. 
Now, AI driven programs are revolutionizing legal research, 
building upon the digitalization that has occurred over the last 20 
years.176 A number of companies have developed applications that 
are able to conduct legal research and this process will improve the 
                                                 
 174 Mills & Uebergang, supra note 164, at 35. 
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452 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 405 
more it is used. The providers of legal research applications include 
Ravel Law, ROSS Intelligence, Lexis Answers, Westlaw Answers, 
and Blue J Legal, all of which claim to offer artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, and natural language processing to identify key 
cases, and to extract relevant passages of judgments based on natural 
language search terms. Already, these applications are providing 
faster and more relevant answers to legal searches than any junior 
lawyer could. For example, ROSS Intelligence uses the NLP power 
behind IBM’s Watson cognitive computer program to allow natural 
question and answer style legal research from the desktop. NLP and 
machine learning allows the program to understand the context and 
meaning of the user’s question, and deliver more relevant results 
than Boolean or NLP processes alone.177 
Preparing the systems needed to conduct research that appears 
effortless takes time and effort. It takes time to clean the data and 
train the algorithms, but as the big repositories of the law are opened 
up to better and faster AI legal research tools, trained on larger and 
larger data sets, this way of researching will likely become more 
available and cheaper. This will allow not only law firms, but 
corporations to use platforms such as ROSS to circumvent law firms 
for their legal research. It will also eat at the work traditionally 
performed by junior lawyers. 
Case Prediction 
Combining access to large, structured data sets with AI 
techniques such as NLP and machine learning, legal technology 
developers are producing analytical tools that can predict likely case 
outcomes with greater accuracy than legal experts.178 LexisNexis’ 
Lex Machina is a litigation data platform originally developed to use 
data mining and predictive analytics techniques to forecast 
outcomes of United States intellectual property litigation. 
LexisNexis’ “Professional Services” package is currently able to 
provide early IP case assessment. It can also prepare profiles on the 
                                                 
 177 DAVID HOULIHAN, ROSS INTELLIGENCE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
LEGAL RESEARCH 11 (2017). 
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parties, law firms, and judges involved and assess likely damages 
awards and lawyer fees.179 In case prediction, Lex Machina claims 
that it “mine[s] litigation data, revealing insights never before 
available about judges, lawyers, parties, and the subjects of the cases 
themselves, culled from millions of pages of litigation 
information.”180 The information available allows Lex Machina to 
predict: 
[h]ow likely . . . a judge [is] to grant or deny a specific motion . . .  , how 
long . . . case[s] [might] take to get to a grant of a permanent injunction, 
to trial, or to termination before a judge [and] how likely . . . a judge [is] 
to find infringement of a patent, fair use of a trademark, or a Securities 
Act violation.181 
Clients will be able to predict the outcome of a case with a 
relative degree of certainty much earlier than the day of the 
hearing—the traditional timeframe.182 This will save clients money 
but, again, will erode law firm profit margins even further. While 
the results of the machine analysis of large amounts of data seems 
to create accurate predictions, this way of mining data, particularly 
about personal attributes of judges and participants is troubling, not 
the least because it has the potential to introduce forum shopping 
and biases.183 Nevertheless, its attractiveness to clients who will be 
able to relatively accurately predict the outcome of litigation before 
they commit large sums of money is undeniable and will further 
circumvent the preparatory work of law firms. This preparatory 
work was not only profitable for the law firm in preparing for the 
initial stages of litigation, but it also ultimately created a dilemma 
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for clients in that they would spend and commit to the litigation past 
the point of no return. An accurate prediction of the outcome of the 
case before this money and effort is spent will allow clients to 
tactically retreat before committing large sums of money to law firm 
work from which there is no return. 
Expertise Automation 
Expertise automation refers to the development of programs that 
combine the expertise of a lawyer in a particular area with an 
artificially intelligent platform to automate the processes of that 
expert. These automated processes are making once specialized 
legal services more consistent and accessible to clients at lower cost. 
Expert systems include web-based systems prepared by legal 
experts to provide scripted answers to structured questions.184 The 
structured interrogation tends to follow a flow chart style of 
question/response until either a solution is provided or the client is 
directed to a live expert. At each stage of the interaction, the 
questioner is provided, or can access, information to inform them of 
the law or their legal rights. A good example of a company that 
provides expert systems is Neota Logic, which offers “an AI-
powered platform and comprehensive toolset that allows 
professionals to rapidly build and deploy application solutions that 
automate their expertise.” 185 
These expertise systems are able to systematise repetitive tasks 
that lawyers would normally spend time on each time they engaged 
a client. Allowing the expertise system to provide this mundane and 
repetitive service frees the lawyer’s time so that they can concentrate 
on more important matters (or altogether, depending on who you 
ask). For example, King & Wood Mallesons has adopted a Neota 
Logic application that, through a series of answers to set questions, 
helps international clients determine whether their deals require 
Foreign Investment Review Board approval.186 King & Wood 
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Mallesons said that the application allowed the firm “to make the 
most efficient use of its experts by enabling junior lawyers to take 
on more of the grunt work . . . . You’re absolutely not making them 
redundant, in fact it means that we’re getting the right work to the 
right person.”187 
The question is, what is the grunt work that these junior lawyers 
are doing and what is the right work? Will junior lawyers be able to 
gain the experience they once acquired from taking months to 
painstakingly review thousands of legal documents and then 
participate in drafting a report on those documents, or will the 
machines continue to learn so that it can perfect its review and 
reporting techniques? Are lawyers freer to concentrate on more 
important matters, or do they become redundant in the case of junior 
lawyers, or a slave to the profits created by the machine in the case 
of law firm partners? Lawyers and law firms are grappling with 
these questions now. These and other new and powerful tools are 
leading to a shift in the way legal work is being conducted and 
offered and further erodes the lawyers’ monopoly on providing legal 
services. 
E. Freer Access to Law – The Austlii Effect 
Another trend that is pressuring the traditional work of law firms 
is the increased free access to the law itself. As recently as around 
20 years ago, the only way that a company or firm could obtain a 
copy of the primary sources of law that affected or controlled that 
company’s conduct was to consult lawyers who held hardcopies of 
legislation and cases in their firm libraries. Lawyers would then 
consult the hard copies, and prepare (often lengthy) advice to the 
company controllers setting out the law and how it might apply to 
the company’s situation. This was typically (and I suspect still is) 
the way that lawyers would issue legal advice. It is time consuming 
and costly, and, therefore, profitable for law firms. It also does not 
often adequately address the issue that the client was concerned 
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about. It is also usually carefully delineated, which requires follow-
up advice and, hence, more cost. 
Austlii was developed in the late 1990s and since then has made 
every statute in Australia and every case considered in Australian 
courts in most jurisdictions freely accessible online.188 It has since 
spread to cover over 200 countries.189 Austlii’s stated aim is to 
improve access to justice.190 Its website claims that it has “over 
700,000 hits daily.”191 It also competes against commercial 
providers such as Westlaw and LexisNexis but has the distinct 
advantage of being free to access. 
It also has another effect. The free access to law that it provides 
has taken the law out of the hands of the law firms and placed it at 
the feet of not only citizens, but the law firms’ clients and NewLaw 
providers. It gives every citizen the ability to read and interpret the 
laws that govern them quickly and for free. The Austlii effect has 
created a number of generations of lawyers now who have never 
known that laws were once locked up inside a law firm or university 
law library. It has, along with the other trends set out above, served 
to demystify the law, a trend that will continue to work against the 
law firm monopoly. 
The five forces that have been outlined in this Part, separately, 
and all of them together, are having the effect of eroding the legal 
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services industry’s monopoly on providing legal services. As anti-
trust and competition laws around the world recognize, monopolies 
are inherently bad in that they drive up prices, stunt innovation and 
create a deadweight loss to society. It is unfortunate that the legal 
services industry has taken the path it has in the pursuit of the 
business dollar. However, these forces militating against the 
monopoly practices of large law firms might not yet spell the death 
of the profession as some have predicted, but, instead, see a rebirth 
of the professional ideals that mark out a profession in the first 
place—only not in the form that one might envision. 
VI.  HOW WILL DISRUPTION CHANGE THE PROFESSION? 
Up until now, I have argued that BigLaw businesses have 
strayed from the path of professionalism by exploiting the monopoly 
over legal services for profit at the expense of clients. In its pursuit 
of profits, the profession has lost the ideal of service to the 
community from which it emanates. It might even be argued that the 
profession as once envisioned, is already dead. The irony of all of 
this is that the lawyer monopoly flourished because law is (or was) 
a profession. Because it was formed as a profession, its members 
were able to set barriers to entry, to carefully curate its membership 
and to self-regulate. 
It is unfortunate that the profession was not sufficiently diligent 
to ward off the detrimental impacts of a monopoly and to maintain 
the altruistic notions of a true profession. Instead, the traits of 
economic professionalism and narcissism noted by Dawson and 
Halliday192 have grown to define the profession. These should have 
been decried and rejected as they arose rather than adopted as 
descriptors of the profession. 
However, since at least the early 1990s, the legal profession, as 
represented by BigLaw, has adopted them with gusto as set out in 
Part IV. Clients have long borne the brunt of the monopoly 
overcharging and failures to innovate. Society has also worn the 
deadweight loss caused by the lost supply of services to those who 
cannot afford to access the law. Increasingly, clients and NewLaw 
providers have reacted to these monopoly practices and have led the 
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disruption of the legal services market; armed with greater 
knowledge of the law, freer access to it, new technologies to help 
find and interpret it, and NewLaw providers. So it is not the 
profession as such, or the tenets of professionalism, at which the 
disruption is aimed, but at the BigLaw firm business model. 
This Part sets out some possible changes to the BigLaw model, 
how NewLaw might develop and what change will mean for the 
work of lawyers. It also makes some bold claims about the how 
lawyers might be replaced by new technology as the new legal 
profession. Based on current trends and the predictions already 
made in the literature, this Part seeks to predict what the future of 
law firms, lawyers and the legal services market might look like in 
the next twenty to thirty years’ time. 
A. The Impact on the BigLaw Firm Model and the Business of 
Law 
Ribstein, then Associate Dean and Professor at University of 
Illinois College of Law, predicted the “Death of Big Law” in 2010.193 
He argued that there were eight pressures on BigLaw including the 
rise of in-house counsel, increasing global competition, 
“deprofessionalization” of the law practice and the decline of hourly 
billing.194 He ultimately concluded that “the real problem with Big 
Law is the non-viability of its particular model of delivering legal 
services.”195 He could not have foreseen the level of degradation in 
the profession, the ferocity of client responses, nor the exponential 
improvements in new technology directed at disrupting the BigLaw 
model in the succeeding 8 years that will inexorably change the 
BigLaw model. Brooks argued that the impact of that technological 
change in the long run can extend “beyond where the original 
expectations were aimed.”196 That is not good news for BigLaw. As 
a result of the current and impending disruption, the BigLaw 
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business model is under threat, and the changes look to be 
unstoppable. 
It is clear that a good part of the systematized work of the junior 
lawyer such as research, discovery review and contract review for 
due diligence, for so long the entrée into legal work for lawyers, will 
eventually be performed by machines involving also perhaps only a 
supervising senior lawyer. Furlong noted in 2017 that the decisions 
that had been made to cut lower-ranked lawyers in the years after 
the financial crisis in 2008 “have evolved into long-term trends 
away from hiring new lawyers and towards the eventual elimination 
of the traditional associate role in law firms. This trend is likely to 
continue for at least the next five to ten years.”197 He also noted that 
“associate leverage, which was once 3:1 and 4:1 in many large firms, 
has fallen to 1:1 or even less.”198 Larkan, a law firm consultant, 
argued that consistent low leverage leads to a range of unsatisfactory 
outcomes for partners, lawyers, and clients including that: 
“[p]artners are forced to do work that would normally be delegated 
down to the lowest competency level. This may mean higher write-
offs, where certain types of work do not justify high rates, and 
unhappy clients.”199 
Larkan ultimately predicted that “the trend towards lower 
leverage is widespread and now well-entrenched [and has] serious 
implications for the long-term health of the legal profession in the 
U.S. . . . I’m not certain the profession can get itself out of this 
situation.”200 As discussed in Part VI, high partner profits are driven 
by their ability to leverage the work of junior lawyers. This drop-in 
leverage then will have a significant impact on partner profits. 
In 2013, in a more optimistic economic analysis of the legal 
services market, Currell and Henderson noted that “the continuing 
success of BigLaw is in part because of its ability to adjust quickly 
to changes in demand by hiring and firing staff”201 and that “by 
quickly adjusting the supply of hours, law firms continued to grow 
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their rates and in many cases increase their profits per partner and 
overall earnings.”202 Indeed, Currell and Henderson trumpeted the 
success of modern day BigLaw firms “by returns to owners, not 
employees.”203 Unconvincingly, they argued that “[o]n this 
traditional metric, law firms are doing just fine.”204 This model is 
unsustainable and the ability of BigLaw firms to fire their way out 
of economic distress and to raise charge out rates and the hours 
worked by partners (sometimes at $1000 per hour) are coming to an 
end. 
Boston Consulting Group predicted that in 5-10 years from 
2016: 
The traditional pyramid model (few partners at the top and many junior 
lawyers and associates at the bottom) will likely give way to an 
organization shaped more like a rocket. That new configuration will be 
characterized by fewer junior lawyers and associates per partner. Indeed, 
the use of technology solutions to handle standard, low-skill legal tasks 
could reduce the ratio of junior lawyers to partners by up to three quarters 
of the ratio seen in the current pyramid model. However, the law-firm 
rocket would be supplemented with other employees who are not 
lawyers, such as project managers and legal technicians. Consequently, 
the number of employees per law firm would remain similar to today, 
while the ratios of high-skilled, specialized legal professionals would 
decline.205 
All of these changes to the structure of law firms will force them 
to develop a different way of billing: a different business model. The 
loss of leverage and the cost of retaining new employees who are 
not fee earners will eat into the law firm bottom line. Law firm 
profits will continue to fall unless an alternative billing system is 
devised that creates the same level of profit as the current billable 
hour system. For so long, law firms have been able to set and forget 
the billing system, but now they will have to create new and 
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innovative billing systems that recoup the same amount of profit as 
the billable hour model. I am not sure one exists. 
Apart from job losses at the lower level and some changes at the 
senior level, there will be other changes to the legal services model. 
It is likely that large law firms will survive by taking on more and 
more specialized and creative legal work. These law firms will 
provide specialist legal advice to companies and will charge a 
premium fee for their expertise and skill. The largest companies in 
the world such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple will need 
to retain these law firms to ensure that regulations are developed to 
suit them, to protect their power by destroying any claims made 
against them, and by providing an effective insurance policy. The 
divide between those that can afford power and influence and those 
who are its subjects will become extreme. There will be little or no 
difference between these firms and the businesses they protect and 
serve, and the markings of a profession will cease to apply to these 
businesses at all. 
The forces outlined in Part V have already led, and will 
inevitably continue to lead, to law firms hiring fewer junior lawyers, 
but all levels of legal service from the BigLaw to the sole 
practitioner will be disrupted. Technologists, with the help of 
lawyers, will continue to commoditize legal work and new and 
newer technologies will continue to perform more and more 
cognitively complex work. As set out in Part V.D, technology is 
taking the place of traditional lawyers, whether they are in the 
bottom half of a large law firm pyramid or sole practitioners. Despite 
the fact that BigLaw and its business model have created the 
conditions for disruption, it is possible that these larger law firms 
will be able to weather the disruption better in the short term than 
sole practitioners and small firms. Larger firms have the financial 
strength and depth of clients that will give them a buffer until they 
can adjust their business models while the disruption takes full 
effect. So, in the short term (say over the next 10-15 years), they will 
be able to continue to charge premium prices for bespoke legal 
advice in specialized areas to a large (but decreasing) number of 
established clients. At the same time, BigLaw firms will continue to 
merge in an effort to find efficiencies until there are fewer and fewer 
mega-firms servicing only the richest and most powerful 
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companies—the Amazons of law if you will. In the ultimate irony, 
only BigLaw firms will be able to afford to adopt all of the legal 
technology available and they truly will have a monopoly on the 
provision of high end legal service. 
BigLaw firms have become hothouses for developing new 
technologies. By providing the training ground for these new 
technologies, BigLaw firms are hastening their development, and by 
doing so, are also shrinking the scale and scope of the work that can 
be performed by all lawyers. There is a danger that, as is often the 
case with new technologies, once these technologies have been 
developed and tested in the larger firms, the price for the 
technologies will fall and they will be dropped onto the general 
market for legal services with potentially devastating effects on all 
lawyers. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the BigLaw firms, by 
incubating new technologies, are also hastening their own demise. 
B. NewLaw Firms, Small Firms and Sole Practitioners 
It is likely that the NewLaw structure under which lawyers are 
retained on contract to perform commoditized tasks on demand for 
a specified price will become the norm. These lawyers may need to 
take on other jobs to supplement their diminishing legal work. 
Furlong considered that lawyers in NewLaw firms will have to 
operate in teams of lawyers, non-lawyers, and clients. He said that 
lawyers retained on contract with NewLaw firms would “work from 
home, on the road, or at clients’ premises” and to “work wherever, 
whenever, so long as the work gets done.”206 This generation of 
NewLaw firms would also need to be hyper-responsive to client 
demands and “understand . . . the realities of customer service-based 
work.”207 Culturally, law firms will be required to jettison 
entrenched systems of working such as “billable hours, associate 
leverage, hand-crafted solutions, [and an] individualistic ethos.”208 
The type of legal work that can be commoditized and performed 
by new technologies makes up a greater proportion of the work of 
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sole practitioners and small law firms. These small firms and sole 
practitioners are likely to suffer greater losses over the short term as 
technologies continue to improve, and clients’ willingness to shop 
around for the best legal advice at the lowest price continues to 
squeeze the margins. Taking these paths to one possible conclusion, 
in around 30 years’ time, the legal services industry will likely be 
made up of two broad legal structures: a diminishing number of 
BigLaw firms, and other providers. Those lawyers who choose to 
continue to practice law will join any number of disparate providers 
of varying legal and administrative services using (or more likely 
monitoring) the technologies that will outperform humans in the 
medium term. Lawyers will not cease to exist, but there will be less 
work for them to perform and there will be very little money paid 
for the type of work that will be required of them. 
The other forces I set out in Part V such as client reactions to 
overcharging, NewLaw providers and new technologies, are likely 
to have a compounding effect on the employment prospects of a 
larger range of lawyers. As new technologies increase in power and 
become more effective, the tasks that they will be able to do will 
broaden to include not just manual and systematic tasks, but also 
many cognitive and creative tasks.209 When this becomes more 
effective, the work of even more senior lawyers will be taken over 
by new technologies. 
C. Lawyers’ Work 
When the edifice of monopoly structures fall and access to law 
is open and free, what of the lawyers? Our society will still need 
lawyers to create the laws that will respond to new challenges, to 
interpret those laws, and to facilitate human transactions. Machines 
are not (yet) capable of conscious thought or of understanding the 
intricacies of humanity; what it means to be human and to interact 
in the world.210 Neither can they be truly creative. Human lawyers 
will need to continue to work in the short and medium terms and, 
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perhaps alongside new technologies, provide a professional service 
to clients—but at a lower cost. 
Clients will demand more and different services from the new 
generation of lawyers. Furlong, a “leading analyst of the global legal 
market and forecaster of its future development[,]”211 called the 
current generation of lawyers the Pivot Generation because it is 
entering law at a time at “which the old legal market collapsed, and 
the new legal market coalesced. We will see how one law firm 
model faded away and another grew in its place.”212 He argued that 
clients will: 
seek basic, sufficient products and services rather than expensive, deluxe 
solutions. They will be stringent judges of value for money, and they will 
not hesitate to haggle or to walk away . . . . To succeed, Pivot Generation 
lawyers must make themselves affordable to this market segment—or 
they will be rendered invisible.213 
Furlong argued that future law firms must “position themselves 
within an array of viable competing service options”214 and that they 
must “redefine what ‘availability’ will mean to clients in the coming 
years . . . . [M]aking a few lawyers and staff available on evenings 
and weekend hours should be strongly considered.”215 He anticipated 
that customers of the future will want to know “the accurate price—
not the billable hour rate or a guesstimate . . . and expect to be able 
to compare the prices charged by several lawyers quickly and easily 
online.”216 He recognized that this market is one of “unprecedented 
competitiveness.”217 
On a somewhat more optimistic note, Furlong argued that, while 
this generation of new lawyers is the most vulnerable to the changes 
that are affecting the legal services market, they “will not be 
victimized by change in the legal market, but will instead lead it, 
taking control of and driving this transitional process.”218 However, 
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it is not all that clear that the new law firm model will be a place 
where lawyers want to work. What will the lawyer of the future be 
required to do to fit in with this new way of working? 
Lawyers have for so long measured their value in their expert 
knowledge of the law, and have been able to commoditize and sell 
it. Lawyers acquired that knowledge over at least three years of 
postgraduate study at university, and then continually developed 
that knowledge throughout their careers. According to Furlong, that 
knowledge will form only one small component of a lawyer’s value 
in the future. He outlined the other work that he saw would be 
required of lawyers of the future, including: 
• “knowledge engineers” who display “legal expertise, but 
also business intelligence regarding costs and workflow[;]” 
• “legal project managers” who would “apply process 
improvement techniques to their workflow and systems[;]” 
• “pricing officers” who calculate profitability, assess market 
intelligence, and “set fixed and ranged fees for their 
services[;]” 
• “artificial intelligence programmers” with “logical minds 
with legal knowledge as well as with basic coding skills[;]” 
• “inside counsel” where “institutional, ‘one-client’ 
employment will surpass law firm employment as the 
primary salaried role for lawyers[;]” 
• “operational specialists” who could “enhance the 
effectiveness and productivity of traditional legal tasks and 
workflow[;]” 
• “flex-time lawyers” who would “work on a project or 
contract basis, often from home” and would “operate on 
flexible hours that suit both the buyer and seller of the 
services[;]” and 
• “preventive lawyers” to minimize “a client’s potential 
exposure to legal damages, creating compliance and training 
systems to improve the legal behaviour of institution, and 
drafting checklists or regimens of healthy legal choices.”219 
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If this list is not foreboding enough, Furlong reminded us that 
lawyers are part of a profession and, as well as displaying all of the 
characteristics outlined above, they must also exemplify the values 
of “the duty to serve the interest of others, the duty to advance 
human dignity, and the duty to defend the rule of law.”220 
Professionals such as lawyers, he argued, exemplify “service, 
selflessness, higher purpose, and making life better for others. . . . 
serving the interests of others, prioritizing those interests above our 
own for a greater cause.” He argued that new lawyers should “gear 
[their] market interactions, office relations, client deliverables, and 
community activities towards improving other people’s 
situation.”221 It is difficult to see who would undertake the arduous 
list of tasks and do it selflessly in service of a higher purpose. Like 
taxi drivers who have faced disruption from Uber and truck drivers 
who face disruption from driverless trucks, lawyers must ask 
themselves whether it is financially viable for them to continue to 
practice law, with all its obligations, including fiduciary obligations 
to clients, or find another means of employment. And there is the 
rub. Who will be prepared, or even able, to provide all of the services 
that Furlong argued that the lawyer of the future will be required to 
undertake, and who will be able to do it while still living the ideals 
of a professional? That person will also have to do all this within a 
business model that replaces the hourly rate—one which, I suggest, 
will lead to a drastic reduction in profits. 
D. The Professional Algorithm 
The ideal entity that will be able to perform or display all of these 
characteristics and qualities will be a computer—or a range of new 
technologies combined in one platform to seamlessly address all of 
a client’s legal needs. This platform of legal technologies will 
eventually be able to perform many, if not all of the tasks that 
Furlong has set out as those that will be required of the future 
lawyer. Computers have knowledge and skills that, if they have not 
already, surpass human knowledge. They selflessly work for the 
good of the client, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day 
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without guile or the need for money. They can be programmed to 
serve the clients’ needs above their own and to work to the benefit 
of society to make life better for others. This is a large part of the 
requirements of a profession. The problem with professions as 
discussed in this paper is that they have been populated by humans, 
whose “hubris and greed”222 has led to them manufacturing a 
monopoly and then a business for the pursuit of profit. This has 
ultimately led to the downfall of the profession and the disruption of 
the law firm model. Computers do not display hubris or greed. 
Leaving aside the fact that failures in morals and ethics are 
human failings that have seen the downfall of the legal profession, 
one has to consider whether computers can provide an adequate 
replacement. There are ongoing debates about whether computers 
are able to attain or display morals or ethics—two characteristics 
that are arguably required of professionals.223 Stahl ultimately 
determined that: 
There are considerable problems with computers as moral agents even if 
one narrows the question down to cognitivist ethics and if one neglects 
all of the agency and personhood questions by relying on the Moral 
Turing Test (MTT). But even if computers could overcome these, if they 
indeed developed an understanding of the meaning of the data they 
process, the next question would then be whether this would suffice to 
pass a more general MTT. Maybe emotions, physical and spiritual 
equality with human beings are necessary for reasoning in a sufficiently 
human way. The conclusion of this paper is therefore that moral agency 
of computers is not in sight. While it may be principally possible it is not 
to be expected soon.224 
Therefore, while computers may be able to replicate the 
knowledge, skills, and the service aspects of professionals, it may 
be some time before a computer fully replaces lawyers as the arbiters 
of our laws. 
A shift from a human professional to a computer one will not 
therefore be an immediate one, but may well develop over time. Like 
automated vehicles, this transition from human lawyer as 
professional to computer could pass through several stages from 
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level 0 for no computer use, to level 5 which will be completely 
autonomous.225 At level 5, each corporation and each person will 
have access to this platform so that access to, and the interpretation 
of, our laws will be free, reliable, and consistent and provided 
professionally. In this way, the members of our society will have 
free access to the laws that govern them. Surely this is an aim of a 
civilized society. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Susskind questioned whether the proliferation of technology 
capable of performing legal work could spell the end of lawyers,226 
or the death of the profession.227 The law has shown itself to be 
vulnerable to disruption—not only because of technology but 
because of the reactions from clients to the consistent overcharging 
by lawyers who have had a monopoly on legal services for over one 
hundred years. At the same time, law will become more freely 
accessible and will be accessed more accurately and quickly by 
machines. Technology is merely the tool used to implement the 
disruption. A side effect of disruption is redundancy. Today’s 
lawyers could be the truck drivers and the taxi drivers of the next 
decade. Despite this ominous prediction, disruption can also drive 
positive change. Lawyers should not be amassing troops at the 
barricades to stave off the advent of new technologies; it is not the 
technology that is at fault. The problem lies with something much 
deeper in the relationship between a society and those chosen to 
develop, interpret and administer its laws. 
It should be a goal of society that its citizens, including 
companies, should have free access to the laws that govern them at 
their fingertips without the need to pay exorbitant fees. Taking the 
profit motive out of providing legal services and opening the law up 
for free access may just have the effect of returning the law to its 
professional roots. The professionals that will prosper in a new era 
will be those doing so from a calling, not from a desire to amass 
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great personal wealth. Society will still need lawyers to create the 
laws that respond to new challenges because machines are not (yet) 
capable of conscious thought or of understanding the intricacies of 
humanity; what it means to be human and to interact in the world. 
In this way, lawyers and legal academics can be part of the rebirth 
of the legal profession. 
This brings us back to our initial discussion of law as a 
profession, as a service to the community. Should we regret or 
mourn the demise of the current model of law firm culture? Why 
more so than the demise of the taxi and trucking industry? We 
should welcome free access to the law without the exorbitant fees 
attached to the money men who have guarded the monopoly for so 
long. By losing these monoliths, we get closer to law as a profession, 
as a service to our fellow man. Surely this should be the aim of a 
civilized society—to have its laws available, understood and 
analyzed consistently for the benefit of society. In this way, the 
wheels of industry will turn and our society will continue to 
function, but without the overpriced transaction costs of lawyers. 
We should embrace the new paradigm in which law and legal 
services are far different, and a more accessible and cheaper option 
for the many rather than the cloistered enclave of the privileged few. 
 
